Imposing Strict Liability Upon a Successor Corporation for the Defective Products of Its Corporate Predecessor: Proposed Alternatives to the Product Line Theory of Liability by Hudak Jr, William J
Boston College Law Review
Volume 23
Issue 5 Number 5 Article 4
9-1-1982
Imposing Strict Liability Upon a Successor
Corporation for the Defective Products of Its
Corporate Predecessor: Proposed Alternatives to
the Product Line Theory of Liability
William J. Hudak Jr
Follow this and additional works at: http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/bclr
Part of the Torts Commons
This Notes is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at Digital Commons @ Boston College Law School. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Boston College Law Review by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ Boston College Law School. For more information,
please contact nick.szydlowski@bc.edu.
Recommended Citation
William J. Hudak Jr, Imposing Strict Liability Upon a Successor Corporation for the Defective Products of
Its Corporate Predecessor: Proposed Alternatives to the Product Line Theory of Liability, 23 B.C.L. Rev.
1397 (1981), http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/bclr/vol23/iss5/4
IMPOSING STRICT LIABILITY UPON A SUCCESSOR
CORPORATION FOR THE DEFECTIVE PRODUCTS OF ITS
CORPORATE PREDECESSOR: PROPOSED ALTERNATIVES
TO THE PRODUCT LINE THEORY OF LIABILITY
Traditionally, corporate law has governed the question whether a suc-
cessor corporation which purchases the assets of a dissolving predecessor cor-
poration will be held strictly liable for injuries caused by defects in the
predecessor's products.' Plaintiffs injured by the predecessor's products
typically will seek to recover from the successor corporation. Because the
predecessor usually is no longer in existence, the successor corporation is the
only entity with assets capable of satisfying the plaintiff's demand.' Under
traditional corporate law principles, unless the successor expressly assumes
liability for the predecessor's obligations, plaintiffs injured by the predecessor's
products can recover only in narrow circumstances. 2 Recently, however, in
Ray v. Alad Corporation 4 and Ramirez v. Amsted Industries, Inc. , 5 the supreme
courts of California and New Jersey have abandoned the narrow confines of
corporate law to hold successor corporations strictly liable in tort for injuries
caused by the predecessor's products when the successor corporation continues
to manufacture the same line of products as its predecessor. 6 Under this so-
called product line theory of liability or product line approach, a successor cor-
poration can be held liable for injuries caused by its predecessor's defective
products even though it did not manufacture or sell the defective product to the
plaintiff, and even though it employs-manufacturing methods which are safe by
comparison to those employed by its predecessor.'
This note will argue that the product line theory of liability unjustifiably
imposes liability on successor corporations because it ignores the method and
extent of the corporate transfer. B A more appropriate solution to the problem of
' For a collection of cases invoking the general rule, see 15 W. FLETCHER,
CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS S 7122 n.1 (1973).
2 See, e.g., Ray v. Alad Corp., 19 Cal. 3d 22, 31-32, 560 P.2d 3, 9, 136 Cal. Rptr. 574,
580 (1977). Plaintiff also might seek recovery from the successor where he is unable to obtain
service of process upon the continuing predecessor corporation. See, e.g., Andrews r. John E.
Smith's Sons Co., 369 So. 2d 781, 784 (Ala. 1979).
• See discussion of traditional exceptions infra notes 15-40 and accompanying text.
4 19 Cal. 3d 22, 560 P.2d 3, 136 Cal. Rptr. 574 (1977).
5 86 N.J. 332, 431 A.2d 811 (1981).
6 Id. at 358, 431 A.2d at 825; Ray v. Alad Corp., 19 Cal. 3d at 34, 560 P.2d at 11, 136
Cal. Rptr. at 582.
In neither Ray nor Ramirez did the court discuss whether knowledge of defects in the
products of the predecessor was required before liability would attach or whether liability would
be imposed on the successor for injuries caused by defects in products of the predecessor where
the successor increases its safety measures. The only apparent prerequisite to holding the suc-
cessor liable for defects in products of the predecessor is that the successor continue the same
product line. Ray v. Alad Corp., 19 Cal. 3d at 34, 560 P.2d at 11, 136 Cal. Rptr. at 582,
Ramirez v. Amsted Industries, 86 N.J. at 358, 431 A.2d at 825.
There are basically three methods of transferring the corporate ownership of a
business: (1) sale of stock by stockholders of the transferor corporation to the transferee corpora-
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successor corporation tort liability lies in expanding upon the traditional cor-
porate law approach. By expanding the corporate law approach, both cor-
porate law and the law of strict products liability may be used to determine
when a successor corporation should be held liable for defects in the products of
the predecessor. In order to evaluate the merits of expanding the traditional
corporate rules, this note will begin by examining the policies underlying the
corporate law and strict liability doctrines. In section I the traditional corporate
approach to successor corporation tort liability will be examined. Emphasis will
be placed on exceptions to the general rule which does not impose liability on
the successor for defects in products of the predecessor and on the imposition of
strict liability under the traditional corporate approach. The section will con-
clude with a discussion of the limitations of the approach. Section II will ex-
amine the product line theory of corporate successor liability. Cases developing
the product line approach will be discussed, and the policies advanced by the
courts in support of the approach will be isolated. In section III, cases rejecting
the product line theory will be discussed. The reasoning of these courts, that
the policy rationales underlying the product line approach do not justify the
drastic change which adoption of the approach entails, will be detailed. Finally,
section IV will evaluate the policies behind the various approaches to successor
corporation tort liability. A theory of liability which would combine an expan-
sion of traditional corporate law principles with a statute of repose 9 and an in-
surance requirement, under which the successor corporation must provide in-
surance for a certain time period to cover injuries caused by defects in products
of the predecessor which occur after the asset transfer, will be proposed. Its ef-
fectiveness and advantages will then be analyzed.
I. THE TRADITIONAL CORPORATE APPROACH
The traditional rules for imposing liability on a corporate successor for the
defective products of its predecessor were derived from the commercial law
governing the rights of creditors of a predecessor corporation when it sold its
business.'° Under commercial law principles, the purchase of corporate assets
tion; (2) purchase of the transferor corporation's assets by the transferee corporation; and (3)
merger or consolidation of the two corporations. Note, The Extension of Product Liability to Corporate
Asset Transferees — An Assault on Another Citadel, 10 LOYOLA L.A. L. REV. 584, 585 (1977)
[hereinafter cited as Note, Extension of Product Liability]. Courts generally look at the transaction as
a whole rather than at the name ascribed to it by the parties to the transfer to determine the type
of transfer. See Wilson v. Fare Well Corp., 140 N.J. Super. 476, 484, 356 A.2d 458, 463 (1976).
For a further discussion of merger and consolidation, see infra notes 21 -23.
9
 Under a statute of repose, the time within which a claim could be brought against
sellers of defective products would begin to run at the date of purchase of the product rather than
at the time of injury. Comment, Limiting Liability: Product Liability and a Statute of Repose, 32
BAYLOR L. REV. 137, 143 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Comment, Statute of Repose]. No claim
could be brought for injuries which result from defects in the product after the statutory period.
Id. For a discussion of how such a statute would operate in the predecessor/successor context, see
infra notes 250 -55 and accompanying text.
10
 Note, Cyr v. B. Offen & Co.: Liability of Business Transferees for Product Injuries, 27
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is insufficient per se to impose responsibility on the purchaser for the seller's
debts and liabilities." The rationale underlying this rule is that claims of
business creditors normally are ascertainable at the time of sale and can be con-
sidered by the parties in fixing the sale price." Since creditors of the
predecessor generally could reach the proceeds of the sale in a suit against the
predecessor, creditors lose nothing when they are denied recovery from the suc-
cessor corporation." Corporate dissolution statutes protect creditors of the
predecessor by providing for satisfaction of the predecessor's debts prior to
distribution of the sales proceeds to shareholders of the predecessor corpora-
tion." Since the courts considered that creditors of the predecessor possessed
an adequate remedy against it, no liability was imposed on the successor cor-
poration.
A. Exceptions to the Rule of Non-Liability
Courts recognized that the commercial law rule which denied creditors of
the predecessor corporation recourse against the successor corporation did not
adequately protect such creditors in all cases." Hence, several exceptions to
the general commercial law rule of non-liability for the corporate successor
were developed under corporate law. Under these corporate law exceptions, a
successor corporation is responsible for the debts and liabilities of its
predecessor if: (1) the successor corporation expressly or impliedly agreed to
assume them:" (2) the successor/predecessor transaction amounts to a con-
solidation or merger of the two corporations;" (3) the successor corporation is a
mere continuation of the predecessor:" or (4) the predecessor's transfer of
assets to the successor corporation was fraudulent in that the only purpose of
MAINE L. REV. 305, 308-09 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Note, Liability of Business Transferees];
Note, Assumption of Products Liability in Corporate Acquisitions, 55 B.U.L. REV. 86, 95 (1975)
[hereinafter cited as Note, Assumption of Products Liability].
" See, e.g., Gee v. Tenneco, Inc., 615 F.2d 857, 863 (9th Cir. 1980).
" Note, Products Liability for Successor Corporations: A Break from Tradition, 49 U. COLO. L.
REV. 357, 359 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Note, A Break from Tradition]. Such claims would not be
considered, however, if the assets were sold without an assumption of liabilities. Id. at 359 n.15.
In the product liability context, of course, claims arising from future injuries caused by defects in
products of the predecessor which have not occurred until after the asset transfer, are not ascer-
tainable at the time of transfer. Note, Liability of Business Transferees, supra note 10, at 310.
" See generally Note, Assumption of Products Liability, supra note 10, at 95.
" See Juenger & Schulman, Asset Sales and Products Liability, 22 WAYNE L. REV. 39,
4041 (1975).
" Note, A Break from Tradition, supra note 12, at 360.
16 See, e.g., McKee v. Harris-Seybold Co., 109 N.J. Super. 555, 561, 264 A.2d 98, 101
(1970), aff'd per curiam, 118 N.J. Super. 480, 288 A.2d 585 (1972). "[A]n implied agreement is
one where the conduct of the parties with reference to the subject matter is such as to induce the
belief that they intended to do that which their acts indicate they have done." Cuneo v. De
Cuneo, 24 Tex. Civ, App. 436, 438-39, 59 S.W. 284, 285 (1900).
" See, e.g., Kloberdanz v. Joy Manufacturing Co., 288 F. Supp. 817, 820 (D. Colo.
1968).
" See, e.g., Barron v. Kane & Roach, Inc., 79 Ill. App. 3d 44, 47, 389 N.E.2d 244, 246
(1979).
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the transfer was to allow the predecessor to escape liability for its debts. 19 The
assumption of liability and fraud exceptions are dear and simple to apply
because they do not involve consideration of the extent of the corporate asset
transfer. For purposes of analyzing when a corporate successor may properly
be held responsible for defects in products of its predecessor, therefore, only the
merger and continuation exceptions need be further analyzed."
The "merger or consolidation' ' 2 ' exception, which imposes liability on the
successor for debts of the predecessor because the predecessor is absorbed by
the successor, has been invoked frequently to hold a successor corporation
liable for the debts of its corporate predecessor. This exception covers statutory
19 See, e.g., Bernard v. Kee Manufacturing Co., 394 So. 2c1 552, 553 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1981).
" The rationale of the first exception, where the successor expressly or impliedly
assumes the predecessor's liabilities, is clear. If the purchaser contracts with the seller to assume
outstanding liabilities, the courts will enforce the obligation. Note, A Break from Tradition, supra
note 12, at 360.
Problems of contract interpretation occur when two separate clauses appear to offer
conflicting intention on the part of the parties regarding assumption by the successor of the
predecessor's liabilities. See, e.g., Travis v. Harris Corp., 565 F.2d 443, 445-46 (7th Cir. 1977).
In such cases, the courts generally will invoke the exception only when the language of the pur-
chase agreement indicates that the parties intended all debts and liabilities to be assumed by the
successor corporation. See id. The court in Travis required a finding that the agreement to assume
liabilities be "clear and unambiguous." Id. at 446. The purchase agreement in Travis clearly
stated that the successor assumed all debts and liabilities existing on the books and records of the
predecessor at the closing date. Id. In Travis, because the product liability claim was not reflected
on the books or records, the successor was not held liable for defective products of the predecessor
under this first exception. Id.
Creditors seek to invoke the fourth exception, fraud in the original transaction, to
recover from the successor corporation where the transfer or assets may be deemed improper by
the law. The various improprieties that have been characterized by courts as fraudulent transfers
are discussed in Annot., 49 A. L.R.3d 881, 884-99 (1973). This exception, designed to protect
creditors, is based on the doctrine of discouraging fraudulent conveyances. The doctrine of
discouraging fraudulent conveyances holds that:
Itiransfers of all of the assets of a person or corporation in straitened cir-
cumstances, without fair consideration, to a corporation having substantially the
same ownership, by which the just claims of creditors are defeated, are of such
fraudulent nature that the new corporation may be held to the debt of the old.
Economy Refining & Service Co. v. Royal National Bank, 20 Cal. App. 3d 434, 439, 97 Cal.
Rptr. 706, 710 (1971). A transfer may be characterized as fraudulent under this exception where
there is evidence that the successor knew the predecessor was attempting to escape liability for its
debts. Annot., 49 A.L.R.3d at 884-87. In most cases, transfers for inadequate consideration will
he set aside as fraudulent since inadequate consideration is evidence of fraudulent intention to
escape liability. See id. at 890-95.
21
 The parties. in a merger contemplate that one corporation will be absorbed by the
other and go out of existence with the absorbing corporation remaining in existence. See, e.g.,
Knapp v. North American Rockwell Corp., 506 F.2d 361, 365 (3d Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421
U.S. 965 (1975); Kloberdanz v. Joy Manufacturing Co., 288 F. Supp. 817, 821 (D. Colo. 1968).
In a consolidation, a new corporation is formed, with the combining corporations dissolving and
losing their separate identities as corporations. Id. For the purposes of this note, there is no dif-
ference between a merger and a consolidation. Hence, the term "merger" will be used to refer to
both kinds of corporate combinations.
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mergers22 and "de facto" mergers. 23 In a statutory merger, the successor ac-
quires the predecessor's stock." In return, the predecessor's shareholders
generally receive no consideration, or the consideration they do receive consists
wholly of shares of the successor's stock." As a result of such stock transfers,
the predecessor is absorbed by the successor corporation. Responsibility for the
predecessor's debts and liabilities is imposed on the successor in this situation
because the successor is viewed as a continuation of the predecessor." If the re-
quirements of a statutory merger are met, the successor corporation is liable for
all claims against the predecessor by its creditors."
Even if a corporate combination does not comply with the formalities of a
statutory merger, a successor corporation still may be held liable for the debts
of its predecessor if the combination is deemed to be a de facto merger." A ma-
jor factor in determining whether a de facto merger has occurred is whether the
assets of the predecessor were transfered to the successor corporation for shares
of stock in the successor or for cash. 29 Where the sale is for cash, the traditional
rule of non-liability applies and the transaction will not be deemed a de facto
merger." The rationale underlying this rule is that where the predecessor's
assets are purchased for cash, the predecessor and successor remain at all times
complete corporate strangers. Absent any common ownership, the successor
cannot be held responsible for decisions of the predecessor which were made
prior to the successor's control of the predecessor's operations. 3 ' A second fac-
tor used to determine whether a transaction is a de facto merger is whether the
asset purchase agreement requires the predecessor corporation to dissolve
22 A statutory merger requires the filing of statutorily prescribed papers and the ex-
change of the assets -of the transferor for stock in the surviving corporation. See Comment,
Expanding the Products Liability of Successor Corporations, 27 HASTINGS L. J. 1305, 1314 (1976)
[hereinafter cited as Comment, Successor Corporations].
23 A de facto merger can be found where the transaction purports to be only a sale of
assets. See, e.g., Knapp v. North American Rockwell Corp., 506 F.2d 361, 365 (3d Cir. 1974),
cert. denied, 421 U.S. 965 (1975). The formal requirements of the statute, e.g., filing papers and
obtaining approval of the required number of shareholders for the sale of assets, are not met in
this instance, but the essential nature of the transaction is the same as a statutory merger. Com-
ment, Successor Corporations, supra note 22, at 1314-15.
" See Ray v. Alad Corp., 19 Cal. 3d at 28, 560 P.2d at 7, 136 Cal. Rptr. at 578.
23 See id.
26 Knapp v. North American Rockwell Corp., 506 F.2d 361, 365-67 (3d Cir. 1974),
cert. denied, 421 U.S. 965 (1975).
" Note, Extension of Product Liability, supra note 8, at 598.
28 See id.
" Ramirez v. Amsted Industries, 86 N.J. at 342, 431 A.2d at 816. As the rationale for
imposing liability in de facto merger cases, courts discussing the stock/cash distinction emphasize
the "continuity of stockholder interest" in the successor corporation present where stock is given
as consideration for an asset transfer. See, e.g., McKee v. Harris-Seybold Co., 109 N.J. Super.
555, 564, 264 A.2d 98, 103 (1970).
3° Tucker v. Paxson Machine Co., 645 F.2d 620, 622 (8th Cir. 1981).
3 ' See McKee v. Harris-Seybold Co., 109 N.J. Super. 555, 566, 264 A.2d 98, 104
(1970).
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within a specified period of time, or as soon as is practicable." Under the tradi-
tional corporate approach, if a dissolution requirement is included in the asset
sale agreement, the successor corporation will be liable for the predecessor's
debts." The rationale for this rule is that, by requiring the predecessor to
dissolve, the successor is deemed to have deprived creditors of a remedy against
the predecessor. 34
 Accordingly, it has been deemed appropriate to subject the
successor corporation to liability in such instances. Whether the merger is
statutory or de facto, the purpose of the merger exception to the traditional rule
of non-liability for successor corporations is the same. That purpose is to insure
that creditors are protected when a transfer results in the predecessor acquiring
no consideration capable of satisfying its outstanding debts.
In principle, the courts consider the third corporate law exception to the
commercial law rule of non-liability, the continuation exception, to be distinct
from the merger exception. 35
 Under this exception, a successor corporation is
liable for the debts of its predecessor when it is a "mere continuation" of the
predecessor. Although the rubric used to impose liability under the continua-
tion exception is different than that used under the merger exception, the
elements necessary to hold the successor corporation liable for the
predecessor's debts are the same." Thus under this exception, the successor's
continuation of the predecessor's operations does not alone render it liable for
the predecessor's obligations." Similarly, as with the merger exception, the
continuation exception traditionally has been invoked only where stock in the
successor corporation was given to shareholders of the predecessor corporation
as consideration for the transfer." Finally, if the management of the
" Knapp v. North American Rockwell Corp., 506 F.2d 361, 369 (3d Cir. 1974), cert.
denied, 421 U.S. 965 (1975).
" Id. By requiring the dissolution of the predecessor, the successor prevents the
predecessor from undertaking any active operations. Id. The successor's actions thus eliminate
the ability of plaintiffs to reach the assets of the predecessor since such assets are non-existent at
the time of injury.
34 See Ramirez v. Amsted Industries, 86 N.J. at 348, 431 A.2d at 820.
3 ' Note, Extension of Product Liability, supra note 8, at 600-01; see also Comment, Successor
Corporations, supra note 22, at 1313-15. In principle, a merger involves one corporation absorbing
an existing corporation. Under the continuation exception, courts have required continuity in
management, business operations and shareholders whether in a new corporation or an existing
one. See id. at 1315.
36 Note, A Break from Tradition, supra note 12, at 362.
" McKee v. Harris Seybold Co., 109 N.J. Super. 555, 570, 264 A.2d 98, 106 (1970).
The purchasing corporation must represent merely a "new hat" for the seller in which the
predecessor corporation remains substantially the same except for the inclusion of new
shareholders. See id.
36 Shannon v. Samuel Langston Co., 379 F. Supp. 797, 801-02 (W.D. Mich. 1974).
Under the traditional continuation exception, liability depends on:
whether the plaintiff is able to establish that there is continuity in management,
shareholders, personnel, physical location, assets and general business operations
between selling and purchasing corporations following the asset acquisition.
Where the commonality of corporate management or ownership cannot be shown,
there is deemed to have been no continuation of the seller's corporate entity.
Ramirez v. Amsted Industries, 86 N.J. at 342, 431 A.2d at 816 (citations omitted).
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predecessor is retained by the successor, the court may deem the successor cor-
poration to be a "mere continuation" of the predecessor." These elements are
similar to those required for a finding of a de facto merger under the merger ex-
ception. The rationale for imposing liability on the successor corporation for
debts of the predecessor under the continuation exception is the same as that of
the merger exception — the protection of creditors."
In sum, corporate law carved out exceptions to the commercial law rule
that the purchase of assets by a successor corporation does not render the suc-
cessor responsible for the liabilities of the predecessor. Of these exceptions, the
"merger" and "continuation" exceptions were the most important. In the
absence of these exceptions to the general rule of non-liability, creditors would
have been unable to collect on outstanding obligations upon the dissolution of
the predecessor unless the successor corporation assumed liability for such
debts in the sale agreement. In practice, the "merger" and "continuation" ex-
ceptions are the same, requiring sale of assets of the predecessor to the suc-
cessor for stock in the successor corporation. These exceptions became the basis
for holding a successor corporation strictly liable in tort for defective products
manufactured by its predecessor.
B. Strict Product Liability Under the Traditional Corporate Approach
Successor corporations have been held strictly liable in tore" for injuries
caused by defects in products manufactured by its predecessor when the asset
transfer fell under the traditional corporate law exceptions to the commercial
law rule of non-liability . 42
 Courts have decided that the reasons which justified
allowing the commercial creditor of the predecessor corporation to proceed
against its successor also justify allowing the tort claimant injured by the
" See Cyr v. B. Offen & Co., Inc., 501 F.2d 1145, 1154 (1st Cir. 1974).
4° Note, Products Liability — Corporations — Asset Sales and Successor Liability, 44 TENN. L.
REV. 905, 908 (1977).
4 ' Under the doctrine of strict liability in tort, the manufacturer or seller of a defective
product may be held liable for injuries caused by such defects regardless of whether the manufac-
turer was negligent in producing the product. See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS S
402A (1965). Prior to adoption of the theory of strict liability, plaintiffs had the difficult burden of
proving the manufacturer's negligence. This burden proved to be prohibitive to injured plain-
tiffs, since the mass production of products made it impossible to locate and establish the cause of
the defect. See McDevitt v. Standard Oil Co. of Texas, 391 F.2d 364, 370 (5th Cir. 1968). Under
the doctrine of strict liability, as adopted by the American Law Institute, the seller of a defective
product is liable to the ultimate user of the product for any harm proximately caused by such
defects so long as the seller is engaged in the business of selling such products and the product is
expected to reach, and actually does reach, the user without having changed substantially from
the condition in which it was manufactured or sold. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS S 402A
(1965). Exercise of all possible care by the manufacturer in the manufacturing of the product is
not a defense to a strict liability claim. Id. In applying strict liability, courts often charge sellers
with the latest scientific knowledge, discoveries and advances. See, e.g., Borel v. Fibreboard Paper
Products Corporation, 493 F.2d 1076, 1089 (5th Cir. 1973). The manufacturer's knowledge is
relevant in determining whether it knew or should have known of the danger of its products and
whether it was negligent in failing to use this knowledge to warn the product user. Id.
+ 2 See infra discussion of cases which follow in text accompanying notes 45-82.
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predecessor's defective products to proceed against the successor." Thus,
under corporate law, a successor corporation may be strictly liable for the
defective products of its predecessor if the merger or continuation exceptions
apply. 44
Courts have imposed strict liability under the corporate law exceptions to
successor non-liability to hold a successor corporation liable for defective prod-
ucts manufactured by its predecessor. In Cyr v. B. Offen & Co.," the Court of
Appeals for the First Circuit, applying New Hampshire law, imposed strict
liability on a successor corporation within the confines of the continuation ex-
ception. In Cyr, one employee was killed and another seriously injured by an
allegedly defective printing press manufactured by B. Offen Company, a sole
proprietorship." Prior to the accident, Bernard Offen, the owner, had died,"
and the bulk of the stock in the business had been purchased by an employee
group." As a condition of the sale, the parties had agreed to run the business in
substantially the same manner as it had been run by the former owner,
Bernard Offen." The Cyr court held that the successor corporation was a mere
continuation of its predecessor. 5° Accordingly, the court found that the suc-
cessor corporation could be held strictly liable for the defective printing press."
The court reasoned that since the same employees continued to work under the
same supervisors, producing the same products in the same plant under the
same name, the company could not be absolved of responsibility simply
because ownership of the entity had changed." Since B. Offen & Co., Inc., the
successor, carried over the expertise of the predecessor, B. Offen Company,
knew the products which the predecessor had produced, was as able as the
predecessor to calculate the risk of defects and was in a position to insure
against injuries caused by the predecessor's defective products, the court chose
to treat the successor as the manufacturer." Accordingly, the New Hampshire
strict liability standard was imposed on the successor corporation.
" See Turner v. Bituminous Casualty Co., 397 Mich. 406, 418, 244 N.W.2d 873, 878
(1976).
44 See supra notes 10.40 and accompanying text.
" 501 F.2d 1145 (1st Cir. 1974).
" Id. at 1148.
•" Id. at 1151.
4° Id. Thirty percent of the stock was purchased by an outside financier. Id.
4° Id. The contract of sale obligated the purchaser for a nine year period to:
(i) cause the Offen Business to be operated continuously ... (ii) cause the Offen
Business to be operated substantially in accordance with the same business prac-
tices and policies as are being employed by Offen at the date of the agreement.
Id.
5° Id. at 1154.
51 Id. at 1153-54. The court reasoned that "[title very existence of strict liability for
manufacturers implies a basic judgment that the hazards of predicting and insuring for risk from
defective products are better borne by the manufacturer than by the consumer." Id. at 1154.
32 Id.
53 Id.
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In Shannon v. Samuel Langston Co. , 54 the United States District Court for the
Western District of Michigan imposed strict liability upon a successor corpora-
tion within the confines of the merger exception. In Shannon, the plaintiff was
injured by a machine manufactured by a company which had dissolved as re-
quired by an asset purchase agreement after selling its assets to the
defendant. 55 The manufacturing enterprise remained substantially unchanged
after its acquisition by the defendant. 56
 Shareholders of the predecessor re-
ceived stock in the defendant-successor corporation as consideration for the
asset transfer." Under these facts, the court found that a de facto merger had
occurred." In applying strict liability to the defendant," the Shannon court
reasoned that since the successor had inherited an established going concern,
receiving all of the advantages of the predecessor, 6° public policy required the
successor to assume the costs which all other going concerns ordinarily must
bear." Continuing, the court stated that corporate entities are artificial beings
created by legislative fiat and that they should not be permitted to discharge
their liabilities to injured persons simply by manipulating the corporate form. 62
In Turner v. Bituminous Casualty Co. 63 the Supreme. Court of Michigan ex-
panded the scope of the continuation and merger exceptions by holding a suc-
cessor corporation strictly liable for the defective products of its predecessor
where the successor had purchased its predecessor's assets for cash." The
plaintiff in Turner alleged that he had been injured in a manner similar to the
54 379 F. Supp. 797 (W.D. Mich. 1974).
55 Id. at 798-99, 801.
" Id. at 799.
" Harris Intertype Corporation (Harris), the successor, acquired all the assets of the
Samuel M. Langston Company, the predecessor, for shares of Harris stock. Id. at 799. The
predecessor changed its name and dissolved. Id. Harris carried on the business under the name
Samuel Langston Company in the same manner as had its predecessor. Id. at 799-800.
" Id. at 801. The court noted that there was certainly a continuity of management,
personnel, physical location, assets, general business operations, and shareholders." Id. In find-
ing that a de facto merger existed in Shannon, the court distinguished McKee v. Harris-Seybold
Co., 109 N.J. Super. 555, 264 A.2d 98 (1970), and other cases where no de facto merger was
found on the ground that the consideration paid by the successor in those cases for the assets of
the predecessor was cash. Id. at 801-02.
59 Id. at 801.
60 These advantages included "expertise, reputation, established customers, and so
forth." Id. at 802.
61 Id.
" Id. at 802. The court found that Mr. Shannon clearly deserved compensation for his
injury if the party responsible for his injury could be found. Id. at 802. Shannon was injured by a
Samuel Langston Company machine. Id. The court found that a going concern should bear the
liability for damages done by its defective products. Id. Liability for such damages can be regard-
ed as a socially necessary cost of doing business. Id. Since the transaction whereby Harris ac-
quired the Langston business was deemed a de facto merger, the court found the successor liable.
Id. at 802-03.
" 397 Mich. 406, 244 N.W.2d 873 (1976).
64 Id. at 342, 244 N.W.2d at 883.
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plaintiff in Shannon." The same successor corporation was involved in both
cases." The court stated that the purpose of the successor corporation was to
bring the predecessor into its corporate structure as a separate division, but to
keep intact the predecessor's own organizational structure and operational
practices. 67
 The court, noticing the lack of legislation covering a successor cor-
poration's tort liability, felt compelled to adopt the traditional corporate law
approach in order to protect tort claimants. 68 The court found that when the
predecessor corporation becomes "defunct," the same problem of recovery ex-
ists for both the commercial creditor and the tort claimant. This is true whether
the consideration given by the successor for the corporate transfer is in the form
of cash or its stock." Recognizing that continuity of ownership is an important
factor in imposing liability on a successor in an assets for stock acquisition, 7 °
the court nonetheless held that the presence of stock as the sole consideration
for the transfer was not conclusive on the issue of successor liability." The
court reasoned that since the number of shares given to the shareholders of a
predecessor in consideration for its assets usually is quite small in comparison
to the total number of outstanding shares in the successor, in most acquisitions
"the strength of commonality of ownership is quite minimal. "72
 Moreover, the
court noted that the shareholders of the predecessor at the time it manufactured
the allegedly defective product and the shareholders of the predecessor at the
time of the asset sale might be entirely different groups.'" Thus, the court
found no reason to treat victims of defects in products manufactured by a
predecessor which sold its assets for cash differently from victims injured after a
de facto merger where the only consideration paid by the successor consisted of
its own stock. 74 Since "[cjontinuity [was] the purpose, continuity [was] the
watch word, continuity [was] the fact,"" the Turner court, following Cyr, de-
65 Id. at 414, 244 N.W.2d at 876. Plaintiff was injured in 1969 by a machine manufac-
tured by the corporate predecessor prior to transfer of assets to the successor. Id. at 411-12, 244
N.W.2d at 875.
66 For a discussion of the corporate succession history of the corporations involved, see
the discussion of Nieves v. Bruno-Sherman Corp., 86 N.J. 361, 431 A.2d 826 (1981), discussed
infra at note 125.
67 397 Mich. at 426, 244 N.W.2d at 882. The successor argued that "business reality"
required it to appear as much as possible like its predeceSsor in order to best utilize the good will
of the predecessor. Id. at 425-26, 244 N.W.2d at 882. Thus, the successor maintained similarity
of product, personnel and policy of its predecessor. Id. at 426, 244 N.W.2d at 882.
6a Id. at 418, 244 N.W.2d at 878. While the Michigan Legislature had spoken on the
problems of creditors and shareholders, it had not yet come to grips with some of the problems of
the much newer field of a successor corporation's liability for defects in products of the
predecessor. Id. Since the question of such liability was one of first impression, the court used the
traditional corporate law of successor liability as a guide in determining whether the successor
should be liable. Id. at 418-20, 244 N.W.2d at 878-79.
65 Id. at 419, 244 N.W.2d at 878.
7° Id. at 421-22, 244 N.W.2d at 879-80.
" Id. at 422-23, 244 N.W.2d at 880.
" Id. at 422, 244 N.W.2d at 880.
73 Id.
74 Id. at 423, 244 N.W.2d at 880.
" Id. at 426, 244 N.W.2d at 882.
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cided to apply the traditional corporate law approach to the tort area to hold
the successor strictly liable for the defective product of the predecessor."
Courts thus have applied the traditional corporate law exceptions to the
rule of successor non-liability to hold successor corporations strictly liable for
defective products of the predecessor. Under the corporate law approach, strict
liability is imposed on the successor corporation for defects in products of its
predecessor corporation only where the nexus between the predecessor and
successor is sufficient to consider the successor to be a continuation of the
predecessor and should therefore be called upon to respond to claimant debt-
ors." The successor corporation's liability thus is based on principles rooted in
the law of contract and corporate finance" and the factual substance of the
asset transfer. Under this approach, only after a court decides in plaintiff's
favor on the corporate issue, in substance holding that the successor is an ap-
propriate defendant, will the court address questions of actual liability." If, for
example, the successor is not found to have been the product of a "de facto"
merger, no liability will attach to it for injuries caused by defects in products of
the predecessor. 8° But, where the successor is found to be an appropriate
defendant, it becomes the manufacturer for liability purposes and may be held
strictly liable for injuries caused by defects in products of the predecessor. This
approach has been criticized by some courts in recent years as not keeping pace
with the developing principles of strict products liability. 8 t These courts stress
the needs of persons injured by defective products put into the stream of com-
merce rather than the form of the asset transfer. 82
C. The Corporate Approach to Successor Tort Liability Criticized
Holding successor corporations strictly liable for defects in the products of
their predecessors only when one of the corporate exceptions applies has been
criticized as placing unwarranted emphasis on the form rather than on the
practical effect of a particular corporate transaction. 83 Traditionally, the de fac-
to merger exception has been held to depend on whether the stockholders of the
predecessor corporation have become stockholders of the successor corpora-
tion." No liability has been imposed in substantially the same circumstances
where the successor corporation has paid for the acquired assets principally in
76 Id. at 430, 244 N.W.2d at 883.
" See discussion of the merger and continuation exceptions, supra notes 16-40.
79 See id. Courts generally examine the terms of the sales agreement to determine if a
merger has occurred. See, e.g., Knapp v. North American Rockwell, 506 F.2d 361, 368-69 (3d
Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 965 (1975).
79
 Courts first seek to determine whether the defendant-corporation can be considered
to be a corporate successor for purposes of assuming liability on behalf of the predecessor. See
Donine v. Fulton Iron Works, 76 III. App. 3d 253, 257, 359 N.E.2d 19, 23 (1979).
99 Id.
al See, e.g., Ramirez v. Amsted Industries, Inc., 86 N.J. at 340, 431 A.2d at 816.
92 Id
63 Id.
" See Travis v. Harris Corp., 565 F.2d 443, 447 (7th Cir. 1977); Shannon v. Samuel
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cash rather than stock." Likewise, under the continuation exception, liability
generally depends on whether a plaintiff is able to establish that there is com-
monality in corporate management or ownership." Where this commonality
cannot be shown, liability does not attach. 87 That some corporate successors
escape liability on what may be deemed "technicalities" has been accepted by
some courts as sufficient justification to depart from the traditional corporate
law approach."
Some courts reason further that the narrow scope of liability under the
traditional corporate law approach is unresponsive to the interests of persons
injured by defective products put into the stream of commerce. These courts
stress that the form of the corporate transaction by which the successor cor-
poration acquired the manufacturing assets of its predecessor should not be
controlling as to its liability for injuries suffered as a result of defects in the
predecessor's product. 89 Principles of strict liability seek to impose liability on
those responsible for placing defective products into the stream of commerce. 9 °
Where the manufacturer of a defective product has dissolved, however, an in-
jured person has no place to turn for relief except to the successor
corporation. 9 ' Critics of the traditional corporate approach thus reason that
denial of recovery based on the form of the corporate transaction is opposed to
the rationale underlying strict liability — that manufacturers owe a duty to
users of their products." As an alternative, some courts have departed from
traditional corporate rules of successor liability and have imposed strict liability
upon a successor corporation for defects in the products of its predecessor
whenever it continues the same line of products.
II. THE PRODUCT LINE APPROACH
Some courts have abandoned the liability limits of traditional corporate
law and have held successor corporations liable for injuries caused by defects in
products of predecessor corporations merely because it continued the
predecessor's product line. The product line approach does not require the
court to consider the substance of the asset transfer, an inquiry which is central
to the traditional corporate approach. The only question under the product line
approach is whether the successor corporation continues to manufacture 'the.
Langston Co., 379 F. Supp. 797, 801 (W.D. Mich. 1974). But see Turner v. Bituminous casual-
ty Co., 397 Mich. 406, 421, 244 N.W.2d 873, 883 (1976).
85 Id.
" See Travis v. Harris Corp., 565 F.2d 443, 447 (7th Cir. 1977); Freeman v. White
Way Sign & Maintenance Co., 82 III. App. 3d 884, 894, 403 N.E.2d 495, 502 01980).
" Id.
" See Ramirez v. Amsted Industries, Inc., 86 N.J. at 340, 431 A.2d at 816.
89 Id.
9° See, e.g., Domine v. Fulton Iron Works, 76 Ill. App. 3d 253, 258, 395 N.E.2d ''9, 23
(1979).
91 Ramirez v. Amsted Industries, Inc., 86 N.J. at 340, 431 A.2d at 816.
°' Id.
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same line of products as did its predecessor." In most cases involving asset or
stock transfers, such an inquiry will be resolved easily since, presumably, the
successor purchases the predecessor's assets for precisely that reason. By con-
tinuing the predecessor's product line, the successor assumes the tort liabilities
of the predecessor. Tort principles of strict liability may be invoked regardless
of the substance of the asset transfer." This section will examine the decisions
of courts adopting the product line approach and will analyze the policies
underlying those decisions.
A. The Leading Cases
California was the first state to depart from the traditional corporate law
approach to successor corporation tort liability. In Ray v. Alad Corporation," the
California Supreme Court held that a corporation which acquires a manufac-
turing business and continues to produce the same line of products as did the
predecessor corporation assumes strict tort liability for defects in units
manufactured and distributed prior to the acquisition. The plaintiff in Ray was
injured in 1969 by a ladder which had been manufactured by the Alad Cor-
poration (Alad 1) 96 around 1952. 97 Prior to the plaintiff's injury, but subse-
quent to his purchase of the ladder, Alad I, in a cash sale, transferred its stock
in trade, fixtures, equipment, trade name, inventory, good will and customer
lists to Lighting Maintenance Corporation (Lighting)." The new ladder
manufacturing enterprise, Alad II, retained the Alad name. 99 By agreement,
Alad I agreed to dissolve as soon as practicable after the transfer."° In addi-
tion, Alad II retained Alad I's factory personnel, salesmen and sales represent-
atives."' Customers of Alad I were not informed of the change in corporate
ownership."' Alad II agreed to assume liability for inventory and supply
materials previously ordered by Alad I and to fill Alad I's outstanding
customer orders. 103 The asset sales agreement, however, did not mention
93 See Ramirez v. Amsted Industries, 86 N.J. at 358, 431 A.2d at 825.
94 Id.
95 19 Cal. 3d 22, 560 P.2d 3, 136 Cal. Rptr. 574 (1977).
96 Id. at 24-25, 560 P.2d at 5, 136 Cal. Rptr. at 575-76.
97 Ray v. Mad Corp., 127 Cal. Rptr. 817, 818 (Cal. App. 1976).
98 Id. at 26-27, 560 P.2d at 5-6, 135 Cal, Rptr. at 576-77.
99 After acquiring Mad I's assets, Lighting Maintenance Corp. (Lighting) published a
certificate of transacting business under the fictitious name of "Alad Co." Id. at 27, 560 P.2d at
6, 136 Cal. Rptr. at 377. Meanwhile, a new corporation under the name of "Stern Ladder Com-
pany" was formed by Lighting's representatives. Id. Stern Ladder Company's name was
changed to Alad Corporation (Mad II) after Mad Corporation (Mad 1) dissolved. Id. Subse-
quently, Lighting transferred all the assets it had purchased from Alad Ito Alad II in exchange
for all of Mad II's outstanding stock. Id.
'°° Id. at 26, 560 P.2d at 6, 136 Cal. Rptr. at 577.
":" Id. at 27, 560 P.2d at 6, 136 Cal. Rptr. at 577.
1 ° 2 Id. at 28, 560 P.2d at 6-7, 136 Cal. Rptr. at 577-78.
LOS Id. at 26, 560 P.2d at 6, 136 Cal. Rptr. at 577. The court determined that this
assumption was limited and did not include the assumption of any other liabilities. Id. at 28, 560
P.2d at 7, 136 Cal. Rptr. at 578.
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potential liability for defective products manufactured by Alad I.'" Despite the
substantial similarities between Alad I and Alad II, the court determined that
the exceptions to the traditional rule of successor non-liability were not ap-
plicable.'" Nonetheless, the court imposed strict liability upon the corporate
successor, Alad II, for the defects in the ladder manufactured by Alad I.'" The
court held that:
a party which acquires a manufacturing business and continues the
output of its line of products under the circumstances here presented
assumes strict tort liability for defects in units of the same product
line previously manufactured and distributed by the entity from
which the business was acquired.'"
Though the court's holding appeared to be limited to the facts of the particular
case before it, the Ray court felt justified in adopting the product line approach
as the law of California.'"
The Supreme Court of New Jersey in Ramirez v. Amsted Industries, Inc. "9
accepted the landmark approach of Ray v. Alad. The plaintiff in Ramirez was in-
jured in 1975 while operating an allegedly defective punch press on the
premises of his employer."° The machine had been manufactured in 1948 or
1949 by Johnson Machine and Press Company (Johnson)."' In 1956, Johnson
transferred all of its assets and liabilities to Bontrager Construction Company
(Bontrager)." 2 In 1962, the defendant, Amsted Industries, Inc. (Amsted), pur-
chased for cash all of the Bontrager assets, including the Johnson assets and the
right to use the Johnson name. "s Amsted retained all of Bontrager's employees
104 Id. at 26-27, 560 P.2d at 6, 136 Cal. Rptr. at 577.
'°' The court found that there was no express or implied agreement to assume liability
for injuries caused by defects in products previously manufactured by Mad I and that there was
no indication of fraudulent intent on the part of Alad Ito escape liability for Alad I's debts. Id. at
28, 560 P.2d at 7, 136 Cal. Rptr. at 578. Further, the court held that the use of cash as considera-
tion for the asset transfer took the case out of the "merger or consolidation" exception. Id. at
28-29, 560 P.2d at 7, 136 Cal. Rptr. at 578. Finally, since there was no showing that one or more
persons continued as officers, directors or stockholders in the successor, and since adequate con-
sideration was given by the successor for the assets of the predecessor which was available to
satisfy outstanding creditor claims against the predecessor, the "continuation" exception was in-
applicable. Id. at 29, 560 P.2d at 7-8, 136 Cal. Rptr. at 578-79.
1 °6 Id. at 34, 560 P.2d at 11, 136 Cal. Rptr. at 582.
107 Id.
1 °8 The wording "under the circumstances here presented" seems to indicate that the
product line approach applies only to cases factually identical to Ray. A California court of ap-
peals in Rawlings v. D. M. Oliver, Inc., 97 Cal. Rptr. 119 (1979), however, read the Ray
holding broadly to encompass situations where the traditional corporate law exceptions do not
apply. For a contrary view, see Johnson v. Marshall and Huschart Machinery Co., 66 Ill. App.
3d 766, 768, 384 N.E.2d 141, 143 (1978).
109 86 N.J. 332, 431 A.2d 811 (1981).
"° Id. at 335, 431 A.2d at 812.
'" Id. at 335, 431 A.2d at 812-13.
112 Id. at 337, 431 A.2d at 814. Johnson conducted no business after its acquisition by
Bontrager but Bontrager did retain a single share of Johnson common stock in order to continue
the Johnson name in corporate form. Id. at 337-38, 431 A.2d at 814.
" 3 Id. The Ramirez court adopted the holding of Turner v. Bituminous Casualty Co.,
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except for three principals who covenanted not to compete for five years." 4
Amsted expressly declined to assume liability for any defective products
manufactured by Johnson or Bontrager, 15 though it did agree to repair defec-
tive products on behalf of Bontrager at Bontrager's cost."s Bontrager then
distributed to its shareholders the cash it received for its assets and dissolved.'"
The Ramirez court concluded that "Amsted may be held to be the mere
continuation of Johnson for the purpose of imposing corporate successor liabili-
ty for injuries caused by defective Johnson products.' 19 Nonetheless, the
court decided to follow Ray and adopt the product line approach for holding
corporate successors strictly liable in tort where they continue the same line of
products manufactured by their predecessors. 19 The holding made plain that
the merger or continuation exceptions under the corporate law approach would
no longer be the standard for determining successor corporation tort liability in
New Jersey.'" The court reasoned that New Jersey's social policy of imposing
the costs of injuries from defective products on the manufacturing enterprise
and the consuming public as a whole rather than on the innocent injured party
in particular 12 ' would best be served by adopting the product line theory of suc-
397 Mich. 406, 430, 244 N.W.2d 873, 883 (1976), in discarding the stock/cash as consideration
distinction. See 86 N.J. at 345-47, 431 A.2d at 818-19.
114 Ramirez v. Amsted Industries, 86 N.J. at 338, 431 A, 2d at 814.
"5 Id. at 339, 431 A.2d at 814. Because Amsted retained Bontrager employees and
assumed repair duties for Bontrager, the court held that Amsted was in a position to gauge the
risks of injury and obtain insurance. Id. at 352, 431 A.2d at 421-22.
16 Id. at 339, 431 A.2d at 814. The purchase agreement did not require Bontrager to
dissolve. See id. at 338-39 & n.2, 431 A.2d at 814 & n.2. But see discussion infra note 117.
" 7 Id. at 338 n.2, 431 A.2d at 814 n.2. The record in Ramirez did not reveal the fate of
Bontrager. Id. The court noted, however, that other courts analyzing the very same corporate
transaction,
have determined that Bontrager distributed the cash proceeds of the transaction to
its shareholders and dissolved its inert corporate existence not long thereafter. See
Korzetz t). Amsted Industries, Inc., 472 F.Supp. [sic] 136, 144 (E.D.Mich. [sic] 1979);
Ortiz v. South Bend Lathe Co., 46 Cal.App.2d [sic] 842, 846, 120 Cal.Rptr. [sic] 556,
558 (Dist.Ct.App. [sic] 1975).
Id.
" 5 Id. at 347, 431 A.2d at 818-19. Amsted purchased all of Bontrager's assets, retained
all existing Bontrager contracts, maintained inventory supplies in accordance with prior practice,
and acquired real property from Bontrager with the stipulation that it be used for continuing
operations. Id. at 346, 431 A.2d at 818. In so finding, the court relied on Korzetz v. Amsted In-
dustries, 472 F. Supp. 136, 144 (E.D. Mich. 1979). Since Amsted was to take on all of Bon-
trager's employees except for three management level personnel, and since Amsted represented
its presses as "Johnson" presses in all its advertising and marketing, the court reasoned that
under the traditional corporate law of successor liability, Amsted was a mere continuation of
Johnson despite the intervening ownership of Bontrager. Id. at 347, 431 A.2d at 818-19. Lack of
continuity of shareholders made no difference since the court had eliminated the cash/stock
distinction. Id. at 347, 431 A.2d at 818-19.
" 9 Id. at 347-48, 431 A.2d at 819.
120 Id. at 358, 431 A.2d at 824-25.
Ill Rather than the plaintiff absorbing the costs of his injury, such devices as insurance
costs and increased product prices would apportion the costs throughout society. See id. at 350-51,
431 A.2d at 820-21.
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cessor corporation tort liability . 122 This social policy is especially fostered by
this approach where the successor holds itself out to the consuming public as
the same enterprise as its predecessor through its use of the predecessor's
name. 123 Thus, in New Jersey and California, successor corporations are strict-
ly liable for injuries caused by defects in the products of their predecessors
where they continue to manufacture the same line of products .' 24
More recent cases in New Jersey and California have expanded the prod-
uct line approach to successor corporation tort liability. In Nieves v. Bruno-
Sherman Corp., 125 the New Jersey Supreme Court held that an intermediate cor-
porate successor which no longer continues to manufacture the product line
may be held liable for the defective products of the original predecessor. 125 The
' 22 Id. at 350, 438 A.2d at 820.
' 23 Id. at 352, 431 A.2d at 822. The court found that Amsted became part of the overall
producing and marketing enterprise by acquiring all of the Johnson assets and continuing the
established business of manufacturing and selling Johnson presses. Id. at 352-53, 431 A.2d at
822.
' 2I Id. at 358, 431 A.2d at 825. Hernandez v. Johnson Press Corporation, 70 Ill. App.
3d 664, 388 N.E.2d 778 (1979), involved the same problem as Ramirez. The Illinois Court of Ap-
peals, however, specifically refused to adopt the product line approach after concluding that no
de facto merger had occurred. Id. at 667-68, 388 N.E.2d at 780. In Hernandez, the plaintiff sought
recovery for injuries sustained when his hands were caught in a punch press manufactured by
Johnson Press Corporation. Id. at 665, 388 N,E.2d at 779. Johnson had dissolved prior to the ac-
cident. Id. The injury occurred subsequent to a transfer of Johnson assets to Amsted. Id. at
665-66, 388 N.E.2d at 779. The court affirmed summary judgment for Amsted based on
Amsted's affidavit stating that: (1) Amsted purchased the assets of the corporation not from
Johnson but from Bontrager Co., which had purchased the assets from Johnson six years earlier;
(2) that Amsted did not at any time assume the liabilities of Johnson; and (3) that Amsted did not
manufacture the press in question. Id. at 665-66, 388 N.E.2d at 779.
' 25
 86 N. J. 361, 366, 431 A.2d 826, 829 (1981). In Nieves, the plaintiff was injured in
1976 by a power press machine manufactured in 1941 by T.W. & C.B. Sheridan Company (Old
Sheridan). Id. at 365, 431 A.2d at 828. In 1964, Old Sheridan sold its entire manufacturing
business, including its good will, trade name and substantially all its other assets to Harris-
Intertype Corporation (Harris). Id. Included among the assets purchased were all sources of in-
formation relating to the Sheridan product line. Id. at 366, 431 A.2d at 829. Harris formed a
new, wholly owned subsidiary (New Sheridan) to continue the Old Sheridan business operations.
Id. at 365, 431 A.2d at 828. New Sheridan agreed to assume all debts and liabilities reflected on
the books and records of Old Sheridan as of the purchase date. Id. In 1972, Harris sold all the
assets of New Sheridan to Bruno-Sherman Corporation, including the good will and manufactur-
ing assets related to the Sheridan press line. Id. at 366, 431 A.2d at 829. Bruno-Sherman express-
ly refused to assume any liability or responsibility for injuries caused by defects in products
manufactured by Harris or Old Sheridan. Id. at 371, 431 A.2d at 832. Harris agreed to maintain
insurance to cover any such claims until the closing date. Id. The insurance agreement provided
that Bruno-Sherman would provide Harris with reasonable assistance in defense of product
liability claims arising from defects in products manufactured by Harris prior to closing. Id. at
371, 431 A.2d at 832. In return, Harris agreed to provide Bruno-Sherman with reasonable
assistance in defense of claims arising from defects in products manufactured by Bruno-
Sherman. Id. at 372, 431 A.2d at 832. The purchase agreement provided that after the closing
date, Bruno-Sherman would purchase insurance to cover claims arising from defects in products
of Harris or Old Sheridan if Bruno-Sherman deemed it necessary to do so. Id. at 371, 431 A.2d at
832.
'" Id. at 370, 431 A.2d at 831. Since the defective product was manufactured by Old
Sheridan, the court held that either of the two successors could be held responsible for injuries
caused by such defects. Id. at 373, 431 A.2d at 832.
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court reasoned that the underlying purpose of the product line approach is to
afford relief where the original manufacturer has dissolved.'" The court noted
that in applying the product line theory of liability emphasis should be placed
on the unavailability of the original manufacturer, rather than on the
availability of one viable successor corporation. 123 Thus, in New Jersey, the
original successor cannot escape liability for its predecessor's defective prod-
ucts merely by divesting itself of the original predecessor's product line.' 29
In Rawlings v. D.M. Oliver, Inc.,"° a California appeals court imposed
liability on a successor corporation for defects in the products of its predecessor
where the product causing the plaintiff's injury was uniquely manufactured by
the predecessor to meet the purchaser's specifications."' The court noted that
the uniqueness of the order of the predecessor's client did not alter the
predecessor's responsibility to market the product safely.'" As such, where the
predecessor manufactures a product to meet the buyer's specifications, a cor-
porate successor which continues the predecessor's line of products in Califor-
nia may be held strictly liable for defects in that product and all other products
within the product line previously manufactured by the predecessor." 3
The product line cases make clear that liability will attach to a successor
corporation for defects in the products of its predecessor if the successor con-
tinues the predecessor's line of products. Under the New Jersey version of the
product line approach, the successor corporation cannot avoid liability by
subsequent sale of assets and discontinuation of the predecessor's line of prod-
ucts. The remainder of this section will examine the reasoning of the courts
which have adopted the product line theory of liability.
127 Id. at 370-1, 431 A.2d at 831.
'" The court noted that emphasis should not be placed on the availability of one par-
ticular viable successor. Id. at 371, 431 A.2d at 831. Rather, the central question is whether the
original manufacturer is unavailable because of dissolution. Id Though Harris subsequently
resold the assets, its acquisition of the business of Old Sheridan contributed to the destruction of
plaintiff's remedies against the original manufacturer. Id.
129 See id. at 373; 431 A.2d at 832.
"° 97 Cal. App. 3d 890, 159 Cal. Rptr. 119 (1979). The plaintiff in Rawlings was in-
jured in 1976 by kelp dryers manufactured in 1969 by Warren Industrial Sheet Metal (Warren).
Id. at 894-95, 159 Cal. Rptr. at 120. The dryers had been manufactured uniquely to meet the
purchaser's specifications. Id. at 894, 159 Cal. Rptr. at 120. In 1977, David M. Oliver pur-
chased certain assets of Warren, including its good will and all the tools, machinery and equip-
ment connected with the business. Id. at 895, 159 Cal. Rptr. at 120. The former proprietors of
Warren retained the land and buildings on which the Warren business was located. Id. The pur-
chase agreement contained a clause whereby Warren agreed to lease the facilities where the
building was .located to David M. Oliver. Id. at 898, 159 Cal. Rptr. at 122. Later in 1977, the
business was incorporated as D. M. Oliver, Inc. (Oliver), doing business under its predecessor's
name, Warren Industrial Sheet Metal. Id. at 895, 159 Cal. Rptr. at 120. The business was con-
ducted after the closing in the same manner as it previously had been conducted. Id. at 898, 159
Cal. Rptr. at 121.
" 1 Id. at 896-97, 159 Cal. Rptr. at 121-22.
1 " Id.
13 Id.
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B. Policy Rationale for the Product Line Approach
The Ray and Ramirez courts concluded that a corporate successor should
be liable for the defective products of its predecessor when it continues the same
product line as that manufactured by the predecessor. 134
 The courts relied on
three policies to support expanding the ambit of corporate successor liability
under the product line approach. First, since the successor benefits from the
corporate good will of its predecessor, it also should be responsible for the pred-
ecessor's defective products.'" Second, the successor as a member of the
overall marketing enterprise is in a better position than the helpless consumer
to gauge the risks of injury and to provide protection from defects in products
of the predecessor and therefore should be responsible for such defects.'"
Third, the injured plaintiff should not be left without a remedy due to the
dissolution of the predecessor corporation.'" In developing this line of reason-
ing the Ray and Ramirez courts relied on the policies underlying the theory of
strict liability in tort.'"
1. Benefit from Corporate Good Will
The Ray court believed that imposing liability on a successor corporation
under the product line approach was justified because a successor inherits and
benefits from its predecessor's good will. 139 The court emphasized that the suc-
cessor corporation in Ray had used the predecessor's name, good will and
customer lists.'" The court reasoned that since the successor had taken the
benefit of the predecessor's name, reputation and other accumulated good will,
the successor also should bear the burden of responding to product liability
claims against the predecessor."' In like manner, the Ramirez court reasoned
that since the successor corporation which continued the Johnson product line
had received substantial benefits by exploiting the Johnson name, it therefore
should hear the burden of defective products produced by Johnson.' 42
134 Ray v. Alad Corp., 19 Cal. 3d at 34, 560 P.2d at 11, 136 Cal. Rptr. at 582; Ramirez
v. Amsted Industries, 86 N.J. at 358, 431 A.2d at 825.
1 " Ray v. Alad Corp., 19 Cal. 3d at 31, 560 P.2d at 9, 136 Cal. Rptr. at 580.
'" See id.
137
 See id,
138 See id. at 34, 560 P.2d at 11, 136 Cal. Rptr. at 583; Ramirez v. Amsted Industries, 86
N.J. at 358, 431 A.2d at 825.
239 Ray v. Alad Corp., 19 Cal. 3d at 34, 560 P.2d at 10-11, 136 Cal. Rptr, at 581-82, In
its broadest sense, good will is an intangible corporate asset which is attributable to the corpora-
tion's reputation. Spheeris v. Spheeris, 37 Wis. 2d 497, 504, 155 N.W.2d 130, 135 (1967). More
precisely, good will is "that element of value which inheres in the fixed and favorable considera-
tion of customers arising from an established and well-conducted business." Id. -
140 Ray v. Mad Corp., 19 Cal. 3d at 34, 560 P.2d at 10, 136 Cal. Rptr. at 581. The
court reasoned that by using Mad I's good will, Mad II obtained benefits not only from the assets
it had purchased from Mad I, but also from the reputation which Mad I had established while it
was in existence. Id. at 34, 560 P.2d at 10-11, 136 Cal. Rptr. at 581-82. By receiving this addi-
tional benefit, Mad II stood in the shoes of Alad I, particularly where Mad I's customers were
not informed of any change. Id. at 28, 560 P.2d at 6-7, 136 Cal. Rptr. at 577-78.
' 4 ' Id. at 34, 560 P.2d at 11, 136 Cal. Rptr. at 582.
142 Ramirez v. Amsted Industries, Inc., 86 N.J. at 352, 431 A,2d at 822.
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2. Successor's Position to Protect Consumers
In adopting the product line approach, the Ray and Ramirez courts rea-
soned that a successor corporation is in a position to absorb the cost of liability
for the predecessor's defective products by passing that cost on to new
customers in the form of higher prices."' This extra revenue could be used to
purchase insurance to cover the risk of injuries caused by the predecessor's
defective products.'" Moreover, by manufacturing the same line of products,
the successor carries over the experience and expertise of the original manufac-
turer."' This knowledge of the predecessor's product line is thought to carry
with it the expertise to minimize the risks of defects in products of the
predecessor currently on the market by warning consumers or providing in-
surance coverage.'"
3. Lack of an Adequate Alternative Remedy
The third policy justification relied upon by the Ray and Ramirez courts for
adopting the product line approach was that the plaintiff injured by a defective
product of a defunct predecessor should not be left without a remedy) ." In a
typical products liability suit against a successor corporation for injuries caused
by a defective product of the predecessor, the predecessor corporation has
dissolved. Thus, there are no assets of the actual manufacturer for the injured
plaintiff to reach. The next logical defendant is the successor corporation which
continues to manufacture the same line of products and seeks to benefit from
the predecessor's good will. Under the traditional corporate approach, where
the corporate law exceptions do not apply, the plaintiff may be left without a
remedy. The Ray court found this justification particularly compelling.'" In
Ray, the predecessor corporation had dissolved. 149 The successor corporation,
Alad II, had received the resources that previously had been available to Alad I
'+' Ray v. Alad Corp., 19 Cal. 3d at 31, 560 P.2d at 9, 136 Cal. 3d at 580; Ramirez v.
Amsted Industries, 86 N.J. at 354, 431 A.2d at 820.
144 Id. at 354, 431 A.2d at 822-23; Ray v. Mad Corp., 19 Cal. 3d at 31, 560 P.2d at 9,
136 Cal. Rptr. at 580.
1 " See Ramirez v. Amsted Industries, 86 N.J. at 352, 431 A.2d at 822. Since the suc-
cessor manufactures the same product line as the predecessor, it can better gauge the dangers in-
herent .in the product if it is defectively designed or manufactured than can the predecessor's
customers. See id. at 351-52, 431 A.2d at 821-22. Thus, insurance can be obtained to compensate
for injuries caused by defects in products of that line. Id. at 352, 354, 431 A.2d at 822, 822-23.
Since Amsted Industries retained the facilities and employees of Johnson and purchased its
customer lists and manufacturing designs, the court held that it was in the same position as
Johnson "to avoid the costs and to spread the risk of accident injuries to users of defective
Johnson power presses." Id. at 352, 431 A.2d at 822.
"6
 Ramirez v. Amsted Industries, 86 N.J. at 351, 431 A.2d at 821.
347 See, e.g., Ray v. Alad Corp., 19 Cal. 3d at 31, 560 P.2d at 9, 136 Cal. Rptr. at 580;
Ramirez v. Amsted Industries, 86 N.J. at 349-50, 431 A.2d at 820.
149 Ray v. Alad Corp., 19 Cal. 3d at 31-32, 560 P.2d at 9, 136 Cal. Rptr. at 580.
149 Id. at 27, 560 P.2d at 6, 136 Cal. Rptr. at 577, The court reasoned that the distribu-
tion of Mad I's assets to its shareholders made it impossible for the plaintiff to obtain satisfaction
of a judgment against Alad I. Id. at 31-32, 560 P.2d at 9, 136 Cal. Rptr. at 577,
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to meet its responsibilities to persons injured by defects in its products.'" With
the Alad I facilities and sources of information at its disposal, Alad II had vir-
tually the same capacity as did Alad I to estimate for purpose of obtaining in-
surance the risk of injuries from defects in Alad I products.'" Rather than
leave plaintiff without a remedy, the court found preferable to impose liabili-
ty on Alad II for the defective product manufactured by Alad 1. 132
Courts which have adopted the product line approach have reasoned that
it is fair to impose liability on a successor corporation for defects in the products
of its predecessor as long as the successor continues the predecessor's line of
products. Reasoning that the successor corporation benefits from the good wil",
of the predecessor, and is in a position to protect persons injured by defective
products of the predecessor even after the predecessor has dissolved, such
courts have chosen to diverge from the traditional corporate approach rather
than leave the injured plaintiff without a remedy. Although it frequently has
been urged upon the courts, the product line approach has not always been
adopted. Indeed, courts rejecting the product line approach have criticized the
reasoning of the courts in Ray and Ramirez. The following section examines
cases which have rejected the product line approach and isolates the policy con-
siderations on which the courts have relied in rejecting the approach.
III. REJECTION OF THE PRODUCT LINE APPROACH
Not all courts having an opportunity to adopt the product line approach
have been persuaded by the policy reasons underlying this theory of corporate
successor liability. Courts applying the law of nine states which thus far have
considered the product line approach have specifically refused to adopt it to
make a successor corporation liable for the defective products of its
predecessor.'" These courts have held that there was not basis in the law of the
"° Id. at 33, 560 P.2d at 10, 136 Cal. Rptr. at 581. In addition to the physical plant and
manufacturing equipment, these resources included "the know-how available through the
records of manufacturing designs, the continued employment of the factory personnel, and the
consulting services of Mad I's general manager." Id.
' 51 Id.
155
	 id. at 33-34, 560 P.2d at 10-11, 136 Cal. Rptr. at 581-82, Since product liability
claims which arose after dissolution of the predecessor were not ascertainable at the time of the
asset sale, the Ray court drew a distinction between traditional corporate law rules and the prod-
uct line approach it established. Application of the traditional creditor rules in such product
liability cases almost inevitably would result in complete denial of. redress to such claimants. Id.
at 32-33, 560 P.2d at 10, 136 Cal. Rptr. at 581. Although some claimants might recover from
retailers since retailers are "sellers" for purposes of imposing strict liability, RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS S 402A, comment f, the retailer would be cut off from the benefit of rights of
indemnification against the manufacturer. Ray v. Mad Corp., 19 Cal. 3d at 33, 560 P.2d at 10,
136 Cal. Rptr. at 581. Rather than leave these parties to bear the burden of the predecessor's
defective product, the court reasoned that the successor, who benefits from the good will of the
predecessor and who is in a position to gauge the risks and spread the costs of accidents should be
held strictly liable. Id. at 33-34, 560 P.2d at 10-11, 136 Cal. Rptr. at 581-82.
1 " Tucker v. Paxson Machine Co., 645 F.2d 620, 625 (8th Cir. 1981) (applying
Missouri law); Rhynes v. Branick Manufacturing Corp., 629 F.2d 409, 410 (5th Cir, 1980) (ap-
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particular jurisdiction in successor corporation tort liability for such a drastic
change ,' 54 or that the question would best be resolved by the state
legislature. 155
A. Cases Rejecting the Product Line Approach
In Domine v. Fulton Iron Works, 156 the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
in Illinois held that the Ray product line approach did not conform to Illinois
state law regarding corporate successor liability.'" In Domine, the plaintiff was
injured in 1973 by an allegedly defective punch press which had been manufac-
tured in 1947 by Ferracute Corporation (Ferracute). 156' In 1968, the defendant,
Fulton Iron Works (Fulton), purchased the Ferracute press product line, in-
cluding its tradenames, trademarks, and other assets. 159 Ferracute remained in
existence as Bridgeton Machine Company (Bridgeton) but covenanted not to
compete with Fulton for four years. ' 6° In denying recovery to the plaintiff, the
Domine court held that the defendant was not the corporate successor to Fer-
racute since the latter had continued to exist as a corporate entity. 161 The court
rejected the product line approach, stressing that Illinois state law allowed the
imposition of strict liability only on defendants which actively participate in
placing the allegedly defective product into the stream of commerce.'" The
plying Texas law); Leannais v. Cincinnati, Inc., 565 F.2d 427, 441 (7th Cir. 1977) (applying
Wisconsin law); Travis v. Harris Corp,, 565 F.2d 443, 448 (7th Cir. 1977) (applying Ohio and
Indiana laws); Bernard v. Kee Manufacturing Company, Inc., 394 So.2d 552, 553 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 1981); Hernandez v. Johnson Press Corp., 70 Ill. App. 3d 664, 669-70, 388 N.E.2d
778, 782 (1979); Domine v. Fulton Iron Works, 76 Ill. App. 3d 253, 257, 395 N.E.2d 19, 23
(1979); Barron v. Kane & Roach, Inc., 79 Ill. App. 3d 44, 49, 398 N.E.2d 244, 247 (1979). See
also Woody v. Combustion Engineering, Inc., 463 F. Supp. 817, 820-21 (ED. Tenn. 1978) (ap-
plying Pennsylvania law); Andrews v. John E. Smith's Sons Co., 369 So.2d 781, 785 (Ala.
1979); Johnson v. Marshall & Huschart Machinery Co., 66 Ill. App. 3d 766, 770, 384 N.E.2d
141, 144 (1978).
' 51 Tucker v. Paxson Machine Co., 645 F.2d 620, 625 (8th Cir. 1981) (applying
Missouri law); Rhynes v. Branick Manufacturing Corp., 629 F.2d 409, 410 (5th Cir. 1980) (ap-
plying Texas law); Travis v. Harris Corp., 565 F.2d 443, 448 (7th Cir. 1977) (applying Ohio and
Indiana laws). See also Andrews v. John E. Smith's Sons, Co., 569 So.2d 781, 785 (Ala. 1979);
Domine v. Fulton Iron Works, 76 Ill. App. 3d 253, 257, 395 N.E.2d 19, 23 (1979).
155 Leannais v. Cincinnati, Inc., 565 F.2d 437, 441 (7th Cir. 1977) (applying Wisconsin
law); Bernard v. Kee Manufacturing Company, Inc., 394 So.2d 552, 555 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1981); Hernandez v. Johnson Press Corp., 70 Ill. App. 3d 664, 669-70, 388 N. E.2d 778, 781
(1979).
156 76 Ill. App. 3d 253, 395 N.E.2d 19 (1979).
157 Id. at 257, 395 N.E.2d at 23.
1115 Id. at 254, 395 N.E.2d at 21.
155 Id. at 255, 395 N.E.2d at 22.
' 6° Id., 395 N.E.2d at 21-22.
1 " Id. at 257, 395 N.E.2d at 23. This fact distinguishes Domine from Ray. In Ray, the
predecessor had dissolved. Ray v. Alad Corp., 19 Cal. 3d at 27, 560 P.2d at 6, 136 Cal. Rptr. at
577. It appeared, however, that the Ray product line holding was applicable since Fulton con-
tinued the output of the line of products of Ferracute. 76 Ill. App. 3d at 255, 395 N.E.2d at 216.
Thus, the court felt justified in discussing Ray in the context of Illinois law. Id at 257, 395
N.E.2d at 23.
162 Id. In Peterson v. Lou Bachrodt Chevrolet Co., 61 111.2d 17, 329 N.E.2d 785 (1975),
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court reasoned that defendants such as Fulton, who are not active participants
in the original production and marketing of the defective product, may not be
held strictly liable for defects in such products.' 63
 The court found no justifica-
tion for imposing liability on a corporation which never represented that the
particular press in question was safe, never promoted its use, and never was in
a position to exert pressure on the manufacturer to enhance the safety of the
press. t64
In Woody v. Combustion Engineering, Inc., 16 5 a federal district court, applying
Pennsylvania law, expressly disagreed with the Ray court's "he who takes the
benefit should hear the burden" analysis.' 66 In Woody, Nicolet, Inc. (Nicolet),
the successor corporation, purchased most of the assets of Keasby & Mattison
Co. (Keasby), the corporate predecessor.'" Good will was included in the
Nicolet retained almost all of the production and middle management
employees of Keasby and continued to manufacture the same asbestos prod-
ucts as did Keasby. 169 Keasby agreed to indemnify Nicolet for all liabilities
which Nicolet had not expressly assurned."° The plaintiff in Woody sued
Nicolet, alleging that he had been injured by products manufactured by
Keasby, which had since dissolved.'" The plaintiff argued that, as the cor-
porate successor of Keasby, Nicolet should bear the responsibility for injuries
caused by defects in products manufactured by Keasby. 172
 The Woody court
disagreed, stating that Nicolet had lost the benefit of its bargain.'" The court
reasoned that since Keasby alone had profited from the sale of the defective
the Illinois Supreme Court specifically refused to impose strict liability upon a defendant who
was outside of the original production and marketing chain. Id. at 20, 329 N.E.2d at 786. The
court held that a used car dealer could not be held strictly liable for the death of a child struck by
an allegedly defective automobile sold by the dealer in the absence of allegations that the defects
in the automobile existed when it left the control of the manufacturer. See id. at 21, 329 N.E.2d at
787.
169 76 Ill. App. 3d at 257, 395 N.E.2d at 23.
164 Id. at 256, 395 N.E.2d at 26.
16' 463 F. Supp. 817 (E.D. Tenn. 1978).
166 Id. at 821.
167 Id. at 819.
166 Id. At least one other corporation purchased the good will and trade name of Keasby.
Id. Nicolet used the Keasby trade name for approximately one year. Id.
169 Id.
' 7° Id. The court found that a paragraph of the purchase agreement providing for this in-
demnification by Keasby established that the parties did not intend that Nicolet assume liability
for defective products manufactured by Keasby. Id.
"' Id. Keasby did no substantial business between the sale in 1962 and its dissolution in
1967. Id.
"I Id. Plaintiff argued that recent cases such as Knapp v. North American Rockwell
Corp., 506 F.2d 361 (3d Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 965 (1975) and Ray v. Alad Corpora-
tion, 19 Cal. 3d 22, 560 P.2d 3, 136 Cal. Rptr. 574 (1977), which expanded the liability of suc-
cessor corporations in product liability actions for defective products of the predecesior, should
be followed rather than traditional corporate law analysis. See id. As interpreted by the Woody
court, these courts argue that the traditional corporate analysis is inappropriate in product liabili-
ty actions where the focus should be on the injured consumer. Id.
' 7. 3 Id. at 821.
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products, Nicolet's only benefit from the transaction was its potential to profit
from use of the Keasby reputation. "4
 Revelation of Keasby's past production
failures, however, the court reasoned, injured that reputation, depriving
Nicolet of the only benefit it had purchased.'" Since the product line approach
imposes liability on a successor corporation for defects in products of its
predecessor merely because the successor continues the predecessor's line of
products, the Woody court rejected the approach. 16
In Leannais v. Cincinnati, Inc.,'" the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Cir-
cuit expressly refused to conduct the balancing of policy considerations in-
volved in adopting the product line approach. 18 In Leannais, plaintiff was in-
jured by a coil slitter machine which had been manufactured by Forte Equip-
ment Co. (Forte) and sold to the plaintiff's employer in late 1964. 19 In
December, 1967, Forte sold its assets to the defendant, Cincinnati, Inc. (Cin-
cinnati), for cash and certain employment agreernents. 180
 In the purchase
agreement, Cincinnati expressly limited its liability for personal injuries caused
by products manufactured by Forte to a five year period from the point of the
asset transfer and agreed to carry insurance for such claims during that time
period."' More than seven years after closing of the asset transfer,'" the plain-
tiff brought suit against Cincinnati, urging the court to hold Cincinnati liable
for defects in the Forte products under the product line theory of liability.'" In
refusing to adopt the Ray product line approach, the court held that there was
not the "slightest indication" that Wisconsin courts would deviate as far from
the long-established corporate law approach as adopting the product line ap-
proach would require.'" An earlier decision by the Wisconsin Supreme Court
' 4 Id
'" Id.
"6 Id.
'" 565 F.2d 437 (7th Cir. 1977).
"° Id. at 441.
19 Id. at 438.
180 Id. The specific employment aspects of the purchase agreement were not noted by
the court. The court did note, however, that the "management of Forte was not carried over to
Cincinnati. Nor did any shareholder of either corporation become an owner, director, or officer
of the other." Id. at 440.
'°' Id. at 438. Paragraph 11(q) of the purchase agreement provided that:
With respect to any claim by a third party, notice of which is given to Forte or
Cincinnati within five (5) years of the Closing Date, based on personal injury
allegedly caused by Forte Equipment as defined in Paragraph 3(b) above, whether
such claims be made against Forte or Cincinnati, Cincinnati shall undertake to ob-
tain, and shall use its best efforts to secure, insurance at its expense against such
claims in the amount of Five Hundred Thousand ($500,000) Dollars . . .
Id. at 438 n.3.
162 See id. at 438-39. This injury occurred approximately five years and four months after
the asset sale, or approximately four months after the period in which Cincinnati had assumed
liability for personal injury claims arising from defects in products of Forte. See id. at 438.
La' Id. at 440.
184 Id, at 441. The court found judicial machinery to be ill-equipped to make decisions
affecting future plaintiffs and defendants. Id. Since court decisions are based on a limited record
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had declared that whether the policy pronouncements of the supreme court of
one state should be imposed on the citizens of another state was a question best
handled by the legislature with its comprehensive machinery for public input
and debate.ie" Since Wisconsin courts had not yet rendered a decision concern-
ing the product line approach, the Leannais court held that the question whether
the product line approach should be adopted was one to be handled by the
Wisconsin legislature.'"
In Travis v. Harris Corp.,'" the same court which decided Leannais held
that the "mere continuation of a name and acquisition of good will [from the
predecessor] cannot of themselves create a duty to warn [in the successor cor-
poration]: "88 The Travis court rejected the product line approach, concluding
that there was no basis in the law of Ohio or Indiana for adopting it as an ex-
ception to the traditional corporate law rule of successor non-liability for claims
against its predecessor. 189 The court reasoned that absent knowledge of the
product's defects or of the owner or location of the product, the successor
doesn't know what it should warn against,' 90 or whom it should warn. ' 91 The
Travis court affirmed a judgment for the defendant successor corporation
because it found that the successor had no knowledge of the particular product
manufactured by the predecessor.' 92
'In sum, nine courts have rejected the product line approach to corporate
successor liability, choosing instead to adhere to the traditional corporate law
developed by the specific parties to the lawsuit, the court reasoned that it could not bind future
parties by holding that the product line approach always should prevail. See id.
I" The court referred to a Wisconsin Supreme Court decision, Holifield v. Setco In-
dustries, Inc., 42 Wis.2d 750, 168 N.W.2d 177 (1969).
106 565 F.2d at 441. Additionally, the court reasoned that federalism principles pre-
vented it, as a federal court sitting in diversity, from imposing the policy pronouncements of the
supreme court of one state upon the citizens of another. Id. Thus, the court felt that it was not at
liberty to adopt the product line approach to impose liability on a Wisconsin citizen. Id.
'" 565 F.2d 443 (7th Cir. 1977).
188 Id. at 448.
1B9 Id. The court noted that there was no basis in the law of Ohio or Indiana on which it
could hold either Harris or Bruno-Sherman liable under the product line theory. Id. The Travis
court did note, however, that a successor might acquire the original manufacturer's duty to warn
of product defects. See id. at 449. The court stated that, under traditional tort law principles, "a
duty to warn arises when a relationship exists between him upon whom the duty falls and the
dangerous situation to be warned against." Id. at 448.
' 9° Id. at 449. According to the court, factors which may be used in determining the
presence of a nexus between the successor and predecessor corporations sufficient to create a duty
to warn include: (I) succession to a predecessor's service contracts, (2) coverage under a service
contract of the particular product which caused the injury, (3) actual service of that product by
the successor, and (4) the successor's knowledge of the defects in the product and of the location
or owner of that product. Id.
1 " Id.
12 Id. There was no service contract under which Harris or New Sheridan would have
been informed of the particular machine in question. Id. Though a New Sheridan serviceman
had visited the prior owner of the machine in 1968, the visit was made in response to a call from
that owner. Id. The court reasoned that, despite being the corporate successor to the manufac-
turer, New Sheridan was in the shoes of any service organization which might have been called
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rules of successor liability. These courts have found that the applicable state
iaw contained no basis for the drastic change in corporate successor liability
which the adoption of the product line approach would entail. In rejecting the
product line approach, these courts have strongly attacked the policies of the
courts favoring adoption of the approach.
B. Policy Rationale of Me Cases Rejecting the Product Line
The policy arguments advanced by the court in Ray to support the product
line approach have been criticized by other state and federal courts. In refusing
to adopt the product line approach, these courts do not agree that successor
corporations benefit from the good will of predecessors or that the successors
are in a position to protect consumers from defects in products of predecessors.
According to these courts, that successors continue to manufacture the line of
products of their predecessors is insufficient to provide plaintiffs with a remedy
against the successors.
1 . Good Will Analysis Criticized
Courts rejecting the product line approach have reasoned that the receipt
of business good will is not a sufficient justification per se for imposing liability
on a successor corporation for the defective products of its predecessor. These
courts have reasoned that the revelation of past production failures deprives the
successor of the benefit of its purchase of the successor's good will.'" The court
in Woody reasoned that a successor corporation has an interest in the good will
and tradename of its predecessor sinct the successor relies on the predecessor's
reputation for excellence in production when the successor markets its prod-
ucts.'" That reputation for excellence is tarnished, however, whenever defec-
tive products manufactured by the predecessor are uncovered.'" In essence, if
the successor must respond to clairnsiof plaintiffs injured by defects in products
of the predecessor, the successor is deprived of the only benefit it has purchased
because the successor can no longer rely on the reputation of the predecessor
established by those products.' 96 It is the predecessor, not the successor cor-
poration, which benefitted by receiving profits from the sale of the defective
upon to repair the machine. Id. Thus, the serviceman's visit to the prior owner was inadequate to
create such a relationship between New Sheridan and the subsequent owner of the machine
(plaintiff's employer) which would give rise to a duty to warn the owner of the product's defects.
Id.
1 " See discussion of Woody v. Combustion Engineering in text supra notes 165-76 and
accompanying text.
'"4 463 F. Supp. at 821.
os
116 Id. The court reasoned that since the successor only profits from products it markets
after the corporate transfer, the only benefit ii: receives from products sold by the predecessor is
good will. See id. When the predecessor's products subsequently prove to be defective, that
benefit is lost. Id. 1
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product which caused harm to the plaintiff.'" Additionally, the predecessor,
not the successor, received the profits from sales of products which, though
similarly defective, did not cause harm. 198 The court concluded that imposing
liability on a successor corporation, where it has received little or no benefit
from its predecessor's defective product, would greatly burden business
transfers and would turn ordinary business transactions into traps for unwary
successor corporations.'"
2. Successor's Position to Protect Consumer Analysis Criticized
Courts rejecting the product line approach also have criticized the second
policy underlying the doctrine, that the successor corporation is in a position to
protect consumers from defects in products of the predecessor.'" These courts
have maintained that the successor was not in such a position and that imposi-
tion of strict liability on it for defects in the predecessor's products where the
traditional corporate law exceptions do not apply is not justified.'" Indeed,
where the corporate exceptions do not apply, principles of strict liability man-
date that the successor not be liable."' The Dordine court noted that it is not the
corporate successor which creates the risk of harm from an allegedly defective
product manufactured by the predecessor.'" A successor corporation has had
no contact with its predecessor's products, and, therefore, has not been part of
the original marketing chain.'" The successor did not invite the injured plain-
tiff to use the product, did not represent to him or to the public that it was safe,
and was in no position to exert any pressure on the manufacturer to enhance
192 Id. This benefit takes the form of profits on sales of products. Id.
L°8 Id.
"9 Id. The court noted that "[i]t is a fortuity that a predecessor corporation does not
dissolve or scatter its assets, in which case no recovery would be possible, rather than sell large
portions of its assets to a particular successor." Id. Thus, to hold the successor liable for the plain-
tiff's injury because it has greater resources than the plaintiff on which to draw to absorb the loss,
would impose a penalty on the successor which the successor could not foresee when it agreed to
purchase the predecessor's assets. See id. Holding a successor liable in such circumstances could
have the effect of permitting the predecessor to escape liability when it dissolves at a later time
although it continues operations after discontinuing the product line. In practice, the predecessor
will be charged with responsibility for defects in products it produced if the predecessor continues
to function. See Woody v. Combustion Engineering, Inc., 463 F. Supp. at 822. If the predecessor
later decides to discontinue its other operations such that it no longer continues to function at all,
however, it follows that the successor, who purchased the product line while the predecessor was
able to be held liable for defects in its own prorLicts, will be held liable for such defects under the
product line approach since the successor continues products of the same line as the predecessor.
An example of a case which may occur while the predecessor still exists is where plaintiff cannot
effect service of process on the predecessor but the forum court can assert jurisdiction over the
successor. In such cases, the successor wit be forced to seek indemnification from the
predecessor.
200 See, e.g., 76 III. App. 3d at 258, 345 N.E.2d at 23.
20 Id.
"2 See id.
2°' 76 Ill. App. 3d at 258, 395 N.E.M at 23.
204 Id. at 257, 395 N.E.2d at 23.
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the product's safety."' Under traditional strict liability principles, only
members of the original marketing chain may be held strictly liable for defects
in products in that chain. 206 A successor corporation which merely continues to
manufacture similar products is not part of the marketing chain of the
predecessor's defective products. 202 Thus, Hernandez, Domine and similar cases
have refused to impose strict liability for injuries caused by defects in the
predecessor's products where the traditional corporate law exceptions did not
apply. 208
The court in Woody expanded this reasoning when it concluded that im-
posing liability on the successor when it merely continued to manufacture
products similar to those made by the predecessor would be as unjust as impos-
ing liability on a competitor of the original manufacturer. 209 One reason strict
liability is imposed on manufacturers is to encourage them to take greater care
in designing and manufacturing products."° The court in Woody noted that en-
tire industries are not held liable in products liability cases because manufac-
turers are held responsible only for their own actions 2 " and for the level of safe-
ty they have selected."' The Woody court therefore concluded that a corporate
stranger"' which purchased the predecessor's assets would not be held respon-
sible for the predecessor's defective products where it had no ability at the time
the product was manufactured to improve its safety.'" To the Woody court,
holding a corporate stranger responsible for its predecessor's defective products
would be comparable to placing liability on the entire industry. Indeed, the
court argued that the policies sought to be fostered by the Ray court in support
of the product line approach to corporate successor liability would be more effi-
ciently fostered by placing liability on the entire industry rather than on the
successor alone. 215
3. Lack of Alternative Remedy Criticized
Courts rejecting the product line theory of liability have found unper-
suasive the argument that merely because a successor continues to manufac-
ture its predecessor's line of products, the successor should compensate plain-
2° 2 Id. at 258, 395 N.E.2d at 23.
885 Id.
282 Id.
288 See supra notes 164 and 176 and accompanying text.
209
 See 463 F. Supp. at 820.
"° Ellithorpe v. Ford Motor Co., 503 S.W.2d 516, 521 (Tenn. 1973).
211 Woody v. Combustion Engineering, 463 F. Supp. at 820.
212 Id. at 821.
213 For the purposes of this note, a "corporate stranger" is a successor corporation
which is sued for injuries caused by defects in a product manufactured by the predecessor, but
which does not fit within the traditional corporate law exceptions..
214
 See id. at 821. The court held that a successor which has merely purchased the assets
of the predecessor should not be liable for the defective products of the predecessor since it was a
stranger to the production process. See id.
212 Id. at 820.
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tiffs for injuries caused by defects in products of the dissolved predecessor. The
Woody court reasoned that while all such plaintiffs may deserve compensation,
such a charitable instinct is insufficient to justify holding liable a successor cor-
poration merely in order to insure that the wealthier party is burdened. 216 Con-
sistent with strict liability, in order to be liable, the defendant must have been
part of the original marketing chain of the defective product, and thereby able
to protect potential plaintiffs."' The Woody court reasoned further that to hold
a successor corporation liable for defects in its predecessor's products is un-
justified since it "is a fortuity that a predecessor corporation does not dissolve
or scatter its assets, in which case no recovery would be possible, rather than
sell large portions of its assets to a particular successor. " 218 Woody concludes
that a successor corporation should not be held liable for defects in products of
its predecessor merely because the predecessor has dissolved. 219
Courts rejecting the product line approach have disagreed with the policy
bases offered by courts which have adopted the approach to successor corpora-
tion tort liability. These courts have reasoned that a successor corporation does
not always benefit from the predecessor's good will and is not always in a posi-
tion to protect consumers from the predecessor's defective products. This
disagreement over the underlying policies of the product line approach to suc-
cessor corporation tort liability has led to the present conflict among the courts
over the appropriate scope of such liability. To resolve the conflict over the
merits of the product line approach, the courts should adopt an approach which
best meets the underlying principles of both strict tort liability and corporate
law. The remainder of this note will examine how such an approach might
operate and how the conflict over the scope of successor corporation tort liabili-
ty might be settled.
IV. AN EXPANDED CORPORATE LAW AND REPOSE APPROACH
Under strict liability principles, liability is imposed on the party respon-
sible for creating the product defect. Neither the product line approach nor the
traditional corporate approach apply this liability adequately in the context of
successor corporation tort liability. On the one hand, the product line ap-
proach, in failing to properly consider corporate law, imposes strict liability on
successor corporations which merely continue to manufacture the
predecessor's line of products. The corporate approach, on the other hand,
fails to assign liability in some instances to successor corporations which in effect
absorb the predecessor corporation which has manufactured the defective
product. A better approach than both of these would be to expand the cor-
porate approach to successor corporation tort liability to encompass situations
716 463 F. Supp. at 821.
7 ' 7 See 76 III. App. 3d at 357-58, 395 N.E.2d at 23.
218
 463 F. Supp. at 821.
219 Id.
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where it is reasonable to impose liability on a successor because of its close con-
nection with the predecessor's manufacturing enterprise. Under the expanded
approach, if the asset transfer falls within one of the recognized exceptions to
the traditional corporate law approach as it currently exists or as expanded, the
successor would be liable for defects in products of the predecessor whether the
asset transfer to the successor was in consideration of cash or stock in the suc-
cessor. In addition, the traditional exceptions will be expanded such that they
are broadly construed to apply where the successor in effect absorbs the
predecessor. In addition, to expand the corporate law approach, one of the par-
ties to each corporate asset transfer should be required to carry insurance for a
statutory period to pay for claims brought by consumers injured by defects in
products of the predecessor which occur after the predecessor has dissolved.
Such a requirement could provide added protection for all parties involved.
Successor corporations would know with certainty whether they will be liable
for defects in products of the predecessor at the time of the asset transfer and for
how long a period. Plaintiffs then will be assured that a predecessor corporation
will be solvent if his injury occurs within the statutory period. Thus, if the
plaintiff proves the product was defective, a remedy for his injury will be
assured. This section will begin with an evaluation of the product line policy
analysis. After concluding that this line of analysis does not justify holding suc-
cessor corporations strictly liable for defects in products of the predecessor, an
alternative to the product line approach will be presented. This alternative ap-
proach will be tested against the same policy considerations.
A. Evaluation of the Product Line Policy Analysis
It is submitted that the rationale of the product line cases does not justify
holding a successor corporation strictly liable for injuries caused by defects in
products of the predecessor where the only connection between the predecessor
and the successor is that the successor continues to manufacture the same line
of products which caused the plaintiff's injury. The only benefit received by a
successor corporation from products produced and sold by its predecessor is its
potential to profit from the predecessor's good will. That benefit is lost,
however, when defects in those products are discovered. Since the successor
only profits from products it markets after the corporate transfer, the only
benefit it received from products sold by the predecessor was the now tainted
good will. Additionally, a successor corporation is in no position to guard
against dangers in products of its predecessor where the successor receives no
knowledge of such products. Thus, imposition of strict liability on successor
corporations under the product line approach is unjustified.
The Ray court stated that receipt and use of a corporate predecessor's good
will is sufficient to justify imposing strict liability on the corporate successor for
injuries caused by defects in products of the predecessor. 22° This analysis of the
220 See, g Woody v. Combustion Engineering, 463 F. Supp. at 821.
1426
	 BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW
	 [Vol. 23:1397
effect on the successor of the predecessor's good will, however, is flawed.
Public knowledge that the product is defective denies the successor of the
benefit of the good will it has purchased."' A successor corporation suffers
reputational damage whenever products manufactured by its predecessor
prove to be defective."' Purchasers of similar products manufactured by the
successor may attribute to the successor the defective products of its
predecessor even though the successor had no part in producing the particular
defective unit.'" Since the successor received no profits from the product which
actually caused the plaintiffs injury, it actually is harmed when persons are in-
jured by defects in such products. 224
 This harm is sufficient. No additional
liability should be imposed. Receipt and use of the predecessor's good will thus
is not per se insufficient to justify imposing strict liability upon the successor for
defective products of the predecessor.'"
In addition to the good will analysis, courts adopting the product line ap-
proach also have emphasized that the successor corporation was in a position to
protect the plaintiff either by preventing the defect or by warning users of the
product of the potential for injury. 226
 This reasoning also is flawed. The suc-
cessor corporation is not part of the original production and marketing chain.
Therefore, it does not have knowledge to warn consumers of, or protect them
from, the defective product and thus cannot guard against the risk of injury.
Strict liability is premised on a party's ability to improve the product's safety
while the product is in its hands.'" Since the defective product never was in the
hands of the successor, strict liability principles do not apply. Holding the suc-
cessor corporation liable for injuries caused by products manufactured often
decades earlier by a predecessor corporation simply because the successor later
acquired the right to manufacture similar products should bind the successor
for mistakes it was in no position to correct."' Where the merger or continua-
tion exception applies, however, the successor was in a position to correct
defects.
The inequity of holding a successor corporation strictly liable for defective
products of the predecessor under the product line approach is apparent where
the successor has no ability to warn users of the defective product because in-
221 See id.
242
	 id.
223
 See id. That purchasers of the successor's products attribute defects in the predeces-
sor's products to the successor follows where there is no attempt to inform customers of the pred-
ecessor of the change in corporate ownership. Where it is apparent that a new corporation con-
tinues the product line of the predecessor, this result will probably not occur.
224
 See id.
222 Domine v. Fulton Iron Works, 76 Ill. App. 3d at 257, 395 N.E.2d at 23.
226 Id. at 357, 395 N.E.2d at 23.
24'
	 e.g., Crowe v. Public Building Commission, 74 Ill. 2d 10, 13-14, 383 N.E.2d
951, 952.
228
 Domine v. Fulton Iron Works, 76 Ill. App. 3d at 357-58, 395 N.E.2d at 23. The
Woody court noted that such a result would be the same as holding an entire industry liable for the
defective products of one company. 463 F. Supp. at 820-21.
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formation and records of the predecessor's products were not transferred.
Although neither the Ray nor the Ramirez courts discussed explicitly whether
knowledge on the part of the successor of the current owners regarding the
predecessor's products should be a prerequisite to imposing liability on the suc-
cessor for defects in those products, the basic rationale of the product line ap-
proach does not require knowledge as a precondition to liability.m In many
cases, however, the allegedly defective product was manufactured years or
even decades earlier and the assets of the actual manufacturer have been
transferred many times."'" In such cases, expecting successors to warn of
potential defects in such products is unreasonable."'
Finally, proponents of the product line theory assert that plaintiffs injured
by defective products of the predecessor should not be left remediless simply
because the predecessor has dissolved."' While it is unjust to deny the plaintiff
a remedy, it would be more unjust to impose liability on an innocent successor
corporation which had no contact with and received no benefits from the defec-
tive product which injured the plaintiff. That the product line approach
operates to assign liability based in part on the subsequent history of the
predecessor-manufacturer leads to further inequities where the policy of pro-
viding a plaintiff with a remedy is elevated above all other considerations."'
For example, the predecessor usually will have dissolved and the plaintiff will
argue that the dissolution of the predecessor justifies imposing liability on the
successor. The product line approach could result in some corporate successors
being held liable while others fortuitously escape liability solely on the basis of
the subsequent history of the predecessor corporation. 234 If the predecessor
does not dissolve, the successor will escape liability. 235
 If prior to dissolution the
predecessor decides to sell its assets to various purchasers so that no single pur-
chaser continues to manufacture the product line of the predecessor, there will
be no "successor," and no recovery at all is possible. 236 If the successor pur-
chases substantially all of the predecessor's assets or those of an entire product
line and the successor does not require dissolution of the predecessor, the suc-
cessor will be held liable under the product line approach if the predecessor
later decides to dissolve on its own initiative. 237 Thus, while plaintiffs may
223
 In both cases, it was sufficient that the successor corporation continued the line of
products of the predecessor. See discussion of Ray and Ramirez supra notes 95-124 and
accompanying text.
230 See, e.g., the product history in Nieves v. Bruno Sherman Corporation, 86 N.J. at
365-66, 431 A.2d at 828-29.
231
 Travis v. Harris Corp., 565 F.2d at 449.
232 See supra note 148.
233
 Woody v. Combustion Engineering, 463 F. Supp. at 821.
23♦ Id.
233
 In such cases, the successor can seek indemnity from the predecessor corporation
which manufactured the defective product. See Hales v. Green Colonial, Inc., 402 F. Supp. 738,
741 (W.D. Mo. 1975).
236
 Woody v. Combustion Engineering, 463 F. Supp. at 821.
237 See id. When a sale of assets originally is consummated, the predecessor's existence
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deserve a remedy, mandating relief from successor corportions merely because
they continue to manufacture a defunct predecessor's line of products assigns
liability at random rather than on principles of strict liability. The product line
approach should therefore not be adopted. Rather, liability should turn on
whether the expanded corporate law exceptions apply. Where they are ap-
plicable, the nexus between the successor and predecessor corporations is close
enough that imposition of liability on the successor for defects in products of the
predecessor is justified.
In summary, the product line approach is inconsistent with principles of
strict liability and corporate law. Under this theory, liability is imposed ran-
domly, based on whether the predecessor corporation is in existence at the time
a plaintiff injured by its product brings suit. If the predecessor corporation has
dissolved, the product line approach provides injured plaintiffs with a new de-
fendant so long as the successor corporation continues to manufacture the same
line of products as did the predecessor. The successor becomes a defendant
under the product line approach even though it may have been in no position
to correct, or warn the plaintiff of, defects in products of the predecessor. The
successor corporation's use of the predecessor's reputation does not justify im-
position of such liability since the , appearance of defects in products of the
predecessor injures that reputation, harming the successor. Thus, courts which
have rejected the product line approach are correct because imposing liability
on the successor merely to provide an otherwise remediless plaintiff with a
remedy operates unjustly.
B. The Corporate Approach Evaluated
The traditional corporate law approach permits successor corporations to
escape liability for defects in the predecessor's products based on what might be
considered a "formality." If the successor purchases the predecessor's assets
for cash, rather than transferring stock in the successor corporation to the
predecessor corporation, no liability will attach even though the cash purchase
is in all other ways identical to the stock purchase. In this situation, assuming
the merger or continuation exceptions otherwise apply, the successor corpora-
tion can properly be called upon to respond for injuries caused by defects in
products of the predecessor because, through the asset transfer, the successor in
effect became the predecessor. Thus, the successor is as able as the predecessor
to gauge the risks of injury to consumers and to provide protection whether the
consideration paid by the successor for the predecessor's assets was cash or
stock.
Neither the traditional corporate law approach nor the product line ap-
proach strikes an adequate balance between the competing interests of granting
injured plaintiffs a remedy and holding a successor liable for defects in products
of its predecessor which it could have anticipated. The product line approach
leans too far toward providing plaintiffs a remedy without considering whether
the successor corporation is a proper defendant. The traditional corporate law
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approach, in contrast, denies plaintiffs a remedy where the successor would be
a proper defendant were it not for technicalities in the form of the asset
transfer.
C. A Proposed Alternative
It is submitted that a better approach to the issue of successor corporation
tort liability would be to expand the corporate approach to hold successor cor-
porations liable where the connection between the successor and the
predecessor is close enough that holding the successor liable for injuries caused
by defects in the products of the predecessor is justified. The connection is close
enough where the traditional merger or continuation exceptions would apply
irrespective of stockholder continuity between the two corporations. Under this
approach, when the merger or continuation exception would apply if it were
not for the presence of cash as consideration for the asset transfer, a successor
corporation may properly be called upon to assume liability for the defective
products of its predecessor. Additionally, the parties to an asset transfer should
be required to make allowances for injuries caused by defects in the products of
the predecessor corporation for an statutorily defined period after the closing
date by providing for insurance to cover claims which arise from defects in
products of the predecessor within that period. This requirement insures the
predecessor's solvency if injuries occur as a result of defects in its products
which occur after the asset transfer and would thus protect plaintiffs injured by
the predecessor's products where the merger or continuation exceptions did not
apply. The proposed alternative approach would eliminate the unduly restric-
tive shareholder commonality requirements and focus on the practical effect of
the corporate transaction. rather than its form. By requiring that insurance be
carried by the successor or predecessor or both for a statutory period, an
equitable remedy can be derived which is fair both to the successor corporation
and to those injured by defective products of the predecessor.
1. Expanding the Corporate Law Exceptions
The traditional corporate law approach establishes a flat rule that if a suc-
cessor corporation buys the assets of a predecessor and cash is the medium of
consideration, the successor will not be liable for the debts of its predecessor.
Thus, the corporate law approach requires commonality of ownership between
the predecessor and its successor as a condition to successor liability."' No
other difference is apparent between a successor where cash, on the one hand,
and a successor where stock, on the other hand, is the consideration given for
the asset transfer."' Since stock has no relevance to a corporation's ability to
provides the successor with protection in the form of indemnification. See supra note 233 and ac-
companying text. When the predecessor has dissolved, however, the plaintiff seeks to hold liable
a viable successor which continues the product line of the predecessor. See Ramirez v. Amsted In-
dustries, 86 N.J. at 351, 431 A.2d at 821.
'3 ' McKee v. Harris-Seybold Co., 109 N.J. Super. 555, 570, 264 A.2d 98, 106 (1970).
2" Shannon v. Samuel Langston Co., 379 F. Supp. 797, 8.1-02 (W.D. Mich. 1974).
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gauge the risks of injury or to warn users of defects in products, the require-
ment that there be commonality of shareholders before liability attaches to a
successor corporation for defects in products of the predecessor should be
eliminated. Rather, a plaintiff should have to prove only that the successor is a
continuation of the same enterprise of the predecessor, regardless whether
stock in the successor corporation was the sole consideration for transfer of
assets. Under this approach, a new category of plaintiffs will be able to recover
from the successor for injuries caused by defects in the predecessor's products.
Under this alternative, liability would be proper as under the merger or con-
tinuation exceptions where: (1) the successor continues the predecessor's enter-
prise, (2) the predecessor dissolves either as required by the purchase agree-
ment or as a result of the asset sale, and (3) the successor assumes those
liabilities and operations necessary for the uninterrupted continuation of the
predecessor's normal business operations.'" Where these three factors exist,
the successor corporation is in a position to protect users of the predecessor's
product from, or warn them of, defects in those products. If these prerequisites
to a finding of merger or continuation of the predecessor are met, liability
should attach to the successor for defective products of the predecessor whether
the consideration given by the successor for the predecessor's assets is shares of
the successor's stock or cash.
The first requirements for successor liability under the proposed approach
is that the successor "continue" the predecessor's enterprise. Continuity be-
tween the successor and the predecessor in management, personnel, manufac-
turing assets and general business operations must exist before the successor
may be considered a proper defendant. 24 ' If these indicia of continuity are pres-
ent, it is reasonable to impose liability on the successor corporation for the
defective products of its predecessor since the only change in the manufactur-
ing operation is the corporate ownership. It is management, however, that
typically makes the daily business decisions of a corporation.'" If the same
management team continues to direct the same employees in the same business
operations in the same plant, the successor can be considered to have been in as
good a position as was the predecessor to gauge the risks of injury from the
predecessor's defective products. The successor, knowing the predecessor's
enterprise and the potential for injury from defects in design or manufacture in
products previously manufactured by the predecessor thus is in a position to
build a better product and is in a position to warn users of such product
defects. 243 Additionally, the successor corporation can calculate the risk of in-
jury from the predecessor's products and can protect itself by obtaining in-
surance to cover injuries caused by defects in such products. Under this ap-
240 See infra notes 241-49 and accompanying text.
241 See Shannon v. Samuel Langston Co., 379 F. Supp. 797, 801 (W.D. Mich. 1974).
242 5 W. FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS § 2096
(1976).
24' See Cyr v. B. Offen & Co., 501 F.2d at 1154.
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proach, plaintiffs properly may seek recovery from the successor corporation.
While thus granting plaintiffs a remedy if the other two conditions are also met,
the successor is not unduly burdened with the predecessor's responsibility to
protect product users from injury.
The second requirement for liability under the proposed standard, is that
the predecessor must cease its ordinary business operations, liquidate, and
dissolve. Currently, dissolution of the predecessor at some later date may result
in the imposition of liability on the unsuspecting corporate successor.'" Under
the proposed standard of liability, the dissolution of the predecessor must have
been required by the successor pursuant to the asset purchase agreement or it
must occur because the agreement left the predecessor no ability to conduct
business without violating a non-competition clause in the purchase agree-
ment.'" This standard recognizes that by causing the predecessor corporation
to liquidate, the successor corporation ultimately is responsible for depriving
injured plaintiffs of a remedy against the predecessor. It will not suffice under
this standard for the predecessor to discontinue the line of products which
caused the plaintiff's injury but continue in other areas of business. Plaintiffs in
such circumstances should continue to have a remedy against the actual
manufacturer of the defective product.'" If only one product line were
transferred to the successor and the predecessor continued to conduct business
in other areas, the subsequent dissolution of the predecessor's remaining
business lines in a transaction unrelated to the successor's asset acquisition
would not cause liability to attach to the successor for injuries caused by defects
in products of the predecessor which the successor continued to
manufacture. 247
 In such a situation, the successor does not deprive the plaintiff
of the proper defendant. If, on the other hand, the predecessor continues to ex-
ist as a corporate entity in name only conducting no business operations,
liability properly may be imposed on the successor since its purchase of the
predecessor's assets in effect brought about the predecessor's dissolution.'"
The final requirement for successor liability under the proposed approach
is that the successor assume those liabilities and obligations of the predecessor
which ordinarily are necessary for the uninterrupted continuation of the
predecessor's normal business operations . 249 Satisfaction of this requirement
indicates that the successor corporation seeks to step into the shoes of the
244 See Turner v. Bituminous Casualty Co., 397 Mich. at 421, 244 N.W.2d at 883.
243
 If the predecessor conducts no business after the asset transfer, the predecessor's
dissolution years later should be presumed to have occurred because of the asset transfer.
246 Under present tort liability rules, if the successor is sued, the predecessor corporation
ultimately may be held liable for defects in its products through indemnification. Hales v. Green
Colonial, Inc., 402 F. Supp. 738, 741 (W.D. Mo. 1975).
2" In such a case, since neither the successor nor the predecessor has assets which may
be reached by the plaintiff, an additional remedy is proposed.
248
 Thus, under the proposed approach, the parties to a corporate transfer may not cir-
cumvent liability by merely continuing the existence of a non-functioning corporate shell.
249
 Assumption by the successor of (1) liability for inventory and supply materials
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predecessor corporation by honoring its prior commitments. By assuming the
predecessor's ordinary obligations, the successor gives notice to customers of
the predecessor that they may continue their dealings with the successor as
though there had been no change in ownership of the manufacturing business
and that the successor corporation stands by the products of its predecessor.
Like the first two requirements for successor liability, this requirement insures
that there is a sufficient connection between the successor corporation and its
predecessor to justify imposing liability on the successor for defects in products
of the predecessor.
This expanded corporate law approach to successor corporation tort
liability will not always provide a remedy to plaintiffs injured by defects in the
products of predecessor corporations. For example, a predecessor corporation
may sell its assets to many corporations, leaving no corporate "successor".
Similarly, the terms of a purchase agreement may not require a corporate
predecessor to dissolve upon the closing of the transaction. Likewise, a suc-
cessor corporation may not assume the ordinary obligations and liabilities of its
predecessor under the expanded corporate law approach. In all cases where the
expanded corporate law approach does not apply, a plaintiff would be
remediless if he brought suit after the predecessor corporation had dissolved.
Therefore, an additional remedy must be derived to protect plaintiffs injured
by defects in the products of defunct predecessor corporations. That remedy is
a statute of repose tied to an insurance requirement.
2. Statute of Repose and Insurance Requirement
In some corporate transfers, the sale agreement will provide that one party
will carry insurance for a certain period of time to cover outstanding product
liability claims against the corporate predecessor. 25° In others, however, the
agreement will . be silent as to such potential liability or the successor explicitly
will refuse to assume liability for injuries caused by defects in the products of
the predecessor."' In the absence of an express contractual undertaking by the
predecessor to provide an insurance fund from which to pay claims for injuries
caused by its defective products, when the predecessor dissolves, it will escape
liability for injuries caused by its defective products. In the absence of such an
undertaking by the predecessor, either the consumer will be left without a
remedy or the successor will be required to pay damages on behalf of the
culpable predecessor. A dilemma exists as to which innocent party will be re-
quired to absorb the costs of the plaintiff's injuries.
One solution to this dilemma is to coordinate a statute of repose 252 with a
previously ordered by the predecessor, (2) debts owed by the predecessor to creditors, or (3) con-
tracts or purchase orders for products to be manufactured through use of the transferred assets,
will suffice to meet this test.
25° See, e.g., Leannais v. Cincinnati, Inc., 565 F.2d at 438.
2" Travis v. Harris Corp., 565 F.2d at 445-46.
"2 A statute of repose "is a legislative enactment which prescribes the period within
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requirement that the predecessor or the successor or both carry insurance for a
certain number of years after the asset transfer if the expanded corporate law
exceptions do not apply to cover claims which might arise from defects in the
predecessor's product. 253 Under this approach, a successor corporation would
be the proper defendant where the plaintiff is injured by a defective product of
the predecessor only when the expanded corporate law exceptions apply. If the
expanded corporate law exceptions do not apply to a successor corporation, the
successor would escape liability for injuries caused by defects in the
predecessor's products. In such a case, the predecessor would be the proper
defendant, and the proceeds of the insurance would be used to satisfy a judg-
ment against the predecessor. Since the statute of repose and in surance re-
quirement seeks to insure that the consummation of an asset transfer does not
deprive plaintiffs of a remedy, failure of the successor and the predecessor to
carry insurance where the expanded corporate law exceptions do not apply
would sustain a judgment against the successor corporation as though it were
the predecessor. The successor in such cases would be treated as the manufac-
turer of the specific defective product because it was responsible for the
predecessor's dissolution and because it failed to follow statutorily prescribed
insurance requirements.
which actions may arise and be brought upon certain claims." Comment, Statute of Repose, supra
note 9, at 143.
2" At least one court has recommended that the state legislature seriously consider such
a statute. See Kozlowski v. John E. Smith's Sons Co., 87 Wis. 2d 882, 992-94, 275 N,W.2d 915,
924-25 (1979). See also Leannais v. Cincinnati, Inc., 565 F.2d at 441. Legislatures should be
given responsibility for determining the specific aspects of such a statute since they are in a posi-
tion to weigh the effects on society of such a requirement. These aspects include such considera-
tions as the number of years the insurance must be carried, the types of products to be covered by
the statute, and the enforcement procedures or civil remedies that should be available. Because of
variations in the useful life of products on the market, the legislature should be flexible in
establishing the length of the statutory requirement for different types of products. See generally
Comment, Statutes of Repose in Products Liability: The Assault Upon the Citadel of Strict Liability, 23
S.D. L. REV., 149, 177 (1978). The requirement should be longer for products such as industrial
machinery which have very long useful lives, than that for less durable products. Injuries from
industrial machinery often occur years or even decades after less durable products would have
been discarded. See, e.g., Nieves v. Bruno-Sherman Corp., 86 N.J. at 365, 431 A.2d at 828.
A reasonable time limit for products with latent defects would be eight to ten years. Com-
ment, Statute of Repose, supra note 9 at 145. Statistics have shown that only a relatively small per-
centage of product liability claims have occurred after that period. The Devils in the Product Liability
Laws, BUSINESS WEEK, Feb. 12, 1979 at 75. "Many products with long lives, especially capital
goods such as presses used in manufacturing, may cause injuries decades after they are first
sold. . . . Data from the ISO [Insurance Services Office] closed-claims survey show that some
4% of the bodily injury claims have not occurred 8 years after the date of manufacture of the
machine involved." Id. States which currently have general statutes of repose, under which the
manufacturer is no longer liable for injuries caused by defects in its products, generally set the
time limit from 6 to 12 years. See, e.g., S.D. COMP. LAWS ANN. 5 15-2-12.1 (1981 Supp.); R.I.
GEN. LAWS, 5 9-1-13 (1981 Supp.); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. $ 12-551 (1982); IND. CODE ANN. 5
34-4-20A-5 (Burns Supp. 1981); NEB. REV. STAT. 5 25-224 (1979); FLA. STAT. ANN. 5
95.031(2) (West Supp. 1981). Eight to ten years is probably within the time range which should
relieve both manufacturers and sellers from claims which arise long after the product is sold while
not overly burdening consumers by leaving them remediless. See Comment, Statute of Repose, supra
note 9, at 145.
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The statute of repose and insurance requirement will impose liability
more fairly upon successor corporations. If the expanded corporate law excep-
tions apply, the successor corporation will be able to foresee the possibility of
strict liability for such injuries and protect itself by obtaining insurance. The
successor can thus spread the costs of injuries from the predecessor's defective
products to society as a whole in the form of higher prices. 254
 If the expanded
corporate law exceptions do not apply, the successor corporation will not be a
proper defendant to an action for injuries caused by the predecessor's defective
products. Thus, where the expanded corporate law exceptions do not apply,
the successor corporation will receive the same treatment as a competitor of the
predecessor who, similarly, had no contact with the predecessor's defective
product. The successor, of course, would be responsible for products it
manufactured after the asset sale.
The statute of repose and insurance requirement provides an acceptable
remedy to plaintiffs injured by defective products of the predecessor. If the ex-
panded corporate law exceptions apply to a successor corporation, the plaintiff
may properly bring suit against it even if the statutory period has expired. If
the expanded corporate law exceptions do not apply, the insurance proceeds in-
sure that the plaintiff in an action against the predecessor within the statutory
period will be compensated for his injuries. Statistics have indicated that most
plaintiffs will be injured within the statutory period. 255
 The ability of plaintiffs
to recover the insurance proceeds would be guaranteed if he meets his burden
of proof under the appropriate state variation of strict liability that he was in-
jured by a defective product of the predecessor.
Under the proposed expanded corporate law and repose approach, some
plaintiffs will still be left without a remedy. The incidence of remediless plain-
tiffs, however, will be greatly reduced. Only where the expanded corporate law
exceptions do not apply and where the statutory period has passed will plain-
tiffs injured by defects in products of the predecessor be unable to obtain the
satisfaction of a judgment. The remainder of this note will evaluate the effec-
tiveness of the proposed alternatives.
D. Evaluation of the Expanded Corporate Law and Repose Approach
Combining a statute of repose and insurance requirement with an expan-
sion of the traditional corporate law approach to successor corporation tort
liability satisfies the policies articulated in Ray and Ramirez without the disad-
vantages of the product line approach. Rather than imposing upon the suc-
cessor the full burden of injuries caused by defects in the products of a defunct
predecessor, the expanded corporate law and repose approach strikes a balance
234 The successor might decide to arrange for the continuation of the predecessor's prod-
uct liability insurance, adjusting the purchase price of the predecessor's assets to take the pro-
jected premium into account. See Shannon v. Samuel Langston Co., 379 F. Supp 797, 802
(W.D. Mich. 1974).
2s3
	 supra note 253.
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between the competing interests of providing a remedy for plaintiffs and not
unduly burdening innocent successor corporations. This approach strikes this
balance by allowing recovery from the successor only under circumstances
where it is reasonable to treat the successor as the predecessor for purposes of
liability. Where it is unreasonable to do so because the successor does not fall
within one of the expanded corporate law exceptions, the plaintiffs still may
recover in most circumstances under the statute of repose insurance require-
ment by suing the defunct predecessor and receiving the insurance proceeds.
The costs of the insurance will be spread throughout society in the form of
higher prices.
The expanded corporate law and repose approach is consistent with the
policies which influenced the development of the product line approach. The
courts in Ray and Ramirez would place responsibility for the predecessor's
defective products on the successor because those courts determined that the
successor was in a position to gauge the risks of injury from those products and
to protect consumers. 256
 Since production methods and managerial decisions
may differ once the manufacturer's assets have been transferred, however, the
successor is not always in a position to protect plaintiffs against injury from
defects in products of the predecessor. The successor may have little or no
knowledge of the risky manufacturing processes carried on by the predecessor.
Yet, the product line approach expects the successor to protect the user of the
product from such risks. Under the expanded corporate law and repose ap-
proach, where the corporate successor continues the predecessor's business as
substantially the same corporation, it no longer can use the paper excuse that
no stock was transferred. As long as there is continuity of the enterprise,
dissolution of the predecessor which is related to the asset transfer, and
assumption of the predecessor's ordinary business obligations by the successor,
the successor fairly can be called upon to answer for product defects of the
predecessor. When these requirements have been satisfied, the only real dif-
ference between the predecessor and successor is the ownership of the latter.
This difference is insubstantial because corporate shareholders do not make the
day-to-day business decisions of the corporation. Business operations and pro-
duction decisions remain substantially the same after the transfer. In addition,
where continuity between predecessor and successor is established, the succes-
sor can be held to have been in a position to have gauged the risks of injury
from defects in products of the predecessor. Since the successor's employees
carry over their knowledge of the predecessor's products, the successor proper-
ly will be held responsible for failing to provide protection in the form of insur-
ance or warn the consumer of the risk of injury from defects in products of the
predecessor. Where the successor is not in such a position, the expanded corpo-
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rate law and repose approach avoids the inequitable result of imposing full
liability on the successor for defects in the predecessor's products.
That some plaintiffs will be left without a remedy under the expanded cor-
porate law and repose approach is a possibility. The class of such plaintiffs,
however, would be fairly small. All plaintiffs injured by defects in products of
the predecessor would be permitted recovery from the predecessor (and, conse-
quently, from the insurance proceeds) if the injury occurred within a certain
number of years and they could sustain the burden of proving that they were
injured by a product which was defective when it left the hands of the
predecessor-manufacturer. Only those persons injured after the statutory
period has expired and where the expanded corporate law exceptions do not
apply to the successor corporation would be denied recovery from either the
predecessor or the successor. While the length of the repose period may ar-
bitrarily deprive some plaintiffs of relief, that arbitrariness is justified by the in-
nocence of the successor corporation. Successor corporations should not be re-
quired to bear the liability for their corporate predecessors' defective products
into the indefinite future. The repose period seeks to strike a balance between
providing plaintiffs with a remedy and the need to protect innocent successor
corporations from unreasonable liability burdens. The expanded corporate law
and repose approach makes departure from corporate law through adoption of
the' product line approach unnecessary by providing relief for plaintiffs without
unduly imposing liability on successor corporations.
CONCLUSION
Under traditional corporate law rules, the purchase of corporate assets is
insufficient per se to impose responsibility on the successor corporation for the
predecessor's debts and liabilities. Under recognized exceptions to the non-
liability rule, a successor corporation is responsible for the debts and liabilities
of its predecessor if: (1) the successor expressly or impliedly agrees to assume
them; (2) the transaction amounts to a consolidation or merger of the two cor-
porations; (3) the successor corporation is a mere continuation of the
predecessor; or (4) the predecessor's transfer of assets to the successor corpora-
tion is for the fraudulent purpose of escaping liability for its debts. Some courts
have found this approach to successor corporation liability too restrictive
because it allows some successor corporations to escape liability for its
predecessor's obligations on the basis of mere technicalities in the form of the
corporate transaction. These courts have departed from the traditional cor-
porate law rules in products liability cases to hold a successor corporation liable
for defects in the predecessor's products as long as the successor continues the
predecessor's line of products. These courts have reasoned that the successor
should bear the costs of injuries caused by its predecessor's products because it
was in a position to gauge the risk of, and protect users from, defects in prod-
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ucts of the predecessor, and because the successor benefits from the "-
predecessor's good will. Many courts which have considered the product line
approach, however, specifically have refused to adopt it. These courts have
relied instead on traditional corporate law principles to hold a successor cor-
poration liable for defects in the products of its predecessor.
The product line approach unjustifiably imposes liability on successor cor-
porations by ignoring the method and extent of the corporate transfer. The ap-
proach assumes that a successor corporation always is a proper party to defend
the actions of its predecessor where the predecessor has dissolved. It holds suc-
cessor corporations liable when the predecessor has dissolved, but not when the
predecessor still is a viable defendant. The approach therefore assigns liability
randomly, without considering whether the successor corporation was in a
position to protect users from, or warn them of, defects in the predecessor's
products.
Expanding the traditional corporate approach and adopting a statute of
repose and an insurance requirement would offer a superior alternative to the
product line approach. Under the approach, successors would be liable for
defects in products of the predecessor regardless of the method of payment as
long as the traditional corporate exceptions were otherwise satisfied. This ex-
panded corporate law approach would be responsive to the policies underlying
the product line approach without unfairly burdening successor corporations.
In addition, a statute of repose insurance requirement would provide plaintiffs
with a remedy if the expanded corporate approach alone proves insufficient to
meet the plaintiffs' needs. This approach balances more equitably than the
product line approach the needs of persons injured by the predecessor's defec-
tive products with the need to prevent the imposition of unjustifiable burdens
on unwary successor corporations.
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